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I.

INTRODUCTION

Corruption has become a "normal" phenomenon all over the
world, especially after the end (?lthe Cold War and the advent
~lglobalization.
Jon S.T. Quah 1

Corruption is not a 21 ' 1 century problem because it "has existed and
been a problem since the beginning of human history." 2 It is "a crime as
old as time" 3 and was "ubiquitous" in ancient Egypt, Israel, Rome and

I. Jon S.T. Quah, ''The Nonnali7.ation of Corruption: Why it Occurs and What can be
Done to Minimize it" (Paper prepared for the United Nations Department of Economic and
Social Affairs, New York, December 2015), p.IJ.
2. Leslie Holmes, Cormption: A Very· Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 20 15 ), p. I.
3. Stephen Moore, Power and Corn1ption: The Rotten Core of Gm•ernme/11 and Big
Business (London: Vision Paperbacks, 1997), pp. 14-2K.
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Greece:' In Roman law, a bribetaker "soils" his hands as a bribe was
"filth" and bribe money in both Latin and English was "dirty."5 "Greasing
the wheels" was a widespread custom in antiquity and corruption was
commonly practised in Greece, "the cradle of democracy," during the 5' 11
century. 6 In The Politics, Aristotle recommended in 350 B.C. that: "to
protect the treasury from being defrauded, let all money be issued openly
in front of the whole city, and let copies of the accounts be deposited in
various wards." 7 On November 9, 2006, two bronze urns were discovered
in Baoji City, China, with inscriptions of 111 ancient Chinese characters
narrating the story of how a noble man, ZHOU Sheng, had bribed the
parents of a legal investigator to avoid being charged for appropriating
farmland and slaves in 873 B.C. 8
Surveys conducted by the British Broadcasting Corporation in 20 I02011 and by Worldwide Independent Network/Gallup International in
2013 indicate that corruption is now the "world's no. I problem." 9
Corruption is a serious problem all over the world especially after the end
of the Cold War and the advent of globalization. However, the World
Bank's taboo on corruption was only broken by its president, James
Wolfensohn, when he spoke of the negative consequences of the "cancer
of corruption" on aid programs at its October 1996 annual meeting. 10
Corruption became an important governance concern among the
international development community during the 1990s because of its high
cost and adverse impact on poverty and development in many countries.
It was estimated by the African Union that African countries lost more
than US$148 billion per year, or 25 percent of Africa's GDP. 11 Corruption
exacerbates poverty in a country by reducing investment and economic
growth and increasing income inequality as lower levels of corruption are
4. Seymour Manin Lipset and Gabriel Salman Lenz. "Corruption. Culture, and ~vtarkets,''
in Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington (Eds.l. Cui/lire Matters: 1/o\\" Value.~ Slwp('
Human Progress (New York: Basic Books, 2000), p. 112.
5. John T. Noonan, Jr., Bribes (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984), p.
xvii.
6. Carlo Albeno Brioschi, Cormption: A Short llistory. trans. Anthony Shugaar
(Washington. DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2017), pp. 9-10.
7. Quoted in Anwar Shah. "Tailoring the Fight against Corruption to Country
Circumstances," in Anwar Shah (Ed.). l'erformance Accowuahility cmd Comhming Cormptio11
(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007), p. 234.
8. "Corruption alive in China 2800 years ago," Chi11a Dai~r. November 19, 2006.
9. Holmes, Corn1ption. p. xiii.
10. Jon S.T. Quah, C11rbing Corn1ption in Asian Co11ntric•.~: An lmpos.~iblc• l>r••am:'
(Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing, 2011 ), p. 7.
II. B.C. Smith, Good GO\·ernance and Derelopment (Basingstokc: Palgravc Macmillan,
2007), p. 175.
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statistically associated with lower levels of income inequality. 12 Hence, it
is not surprising that corruption has been identified as an important global
issue affecting development. 13
The globali7..ation of corruption has contributed to an overriding
concern among governments and international organizations on how to
combat corruption in many countries. The globalization of electronic
communications has increased the opportunities for corruption, "the
difficulty in controlling it, and the potential damage it can inflict" because
of the case in transferring money across borders and laundering "funds of
dubious origin. " 14 International organizations like the Asian Development
Bank (ADB), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World
Bank, have organized many international conferences and workshops on
the causes, consequences and control of corruption in various countries
since the 1990sY
Table 1: 27 Asian Countries by CPI Scores in 2016
CPI
Score•
80- I00
70- 79
60- 69
50- 59
()- 49

Countries

No.(%)

Singaoore (84)
Hong Kong SAR (77), Japan (72)
Bhutan (65), Taiwan (61)
Brunei Darussalam (58)
South Korea (53)
Malaysia (49), China, India (40)
Mongolia (38), Indonesia (37)
Maldives, Sri Lanka (36)
Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste
(35), Vietnam (33), Pakistan (32)
Lao PDR (30), Nepal (29)
Mvanmar, Paoua New Guinea (28)

I (3.7%)
2 (7.4%)
2 (7.4%)
2 (7.4%)
20 (74.1%)

12. Bertram I. Spector, Detecting Corntption in Del•eloping Coumries: ldemifying
Cal/ses!Strmegiesfor Action (Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press, 2012), pp. 25-32.
13. Vinay Bhargava. "Curing the Cancer of Corruption," in Vinay K. Bhargava (Ed.).
(1/obal I.Wit'.t /iJr (ifolml Citi=ens:
( Wa<hingtnn,

:ltl

lmrodllcticm to Key Del·e/opment Challenges

nr: World Rank. 2001l). Chapter I R. pp. :141-:170.

14. Patrick Glynn, Stephen J. Kubrin and Moiscs Naim, "The Globalization of Corruption,"
in Kimberly Ann Elliott (F.d.), Cormption and the Global Economy (Washington, DC: Institute
for lnlcm:uional Economics, 1'>'>7), pp. 12, 14-15.
15. Sec for example, Sahr J. Kpundch and Irene Hors (Eds.), Corntption and /11/egri~l'
lmprm·ement lnitiath·es in /Jew/oping Countries (New York: UNDP, 1998) and ADB and
OECU, Combating Corntptiollill Asian a11d Pacijic t:conomies

(Mamla: AUH. :.!UUU).
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Total

Bangladesh (26), Cambodia (21)
Afghanistan ( 15), North Korea ( 12)
27 countries

27 (100%)

•The CPI score ranges from 0 (very corrupt) to 100 (highly clean). To be included in the
CPI, a country must have three independent surveys on its perceived extent of public sector
corruption .
."iource: "Corruption Perceptions Index 2016," Berlin, available at:
https://www. transparcncy.orglncws/fcaturc/corruption_perccptions_indcx_20 16
(accessed January 25, 20 17 ).

Social problems are "wicked" because they arc "ill-defined," "rely
upon elusive political judgment for resolution" and arc "never solved.'*'
Corruption is a "wicked problem" 17 in many Asian countries in spite of
their anti-corruption efforts during the past six decades. Their
disappointing performance on Transparency International's Corruption
Perceptions Index (CPI) in 2016 is shown in Table 1, which indicates that
only seven countries have CPI scores above 50, with Singapore being the
least corrupt Asian country as it is ranked 7'h among 176 countries with a
score of 84. By contrast, the other 20 countries (74.1 percent) have low
scores ranging from 12 for North Korea to 49 for Malaysia.
Why have their anti-corruption initiatives failed and what can Asian
policymakers do to minimize corruption in their countries? Unlike
previous efforts, 18 this monograph addresses these questions by
identifying the contextual constraints influencing the implementation of
anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) in six Asian countries. Its main thesis is
that most ACAs in Asian countries have failed not only because of the lack
of political will and capacity but also because their policymakers have not
addressed the causes of corruption. Gregory contends that "policy advice
is needed to better inform the policy decisions taken and to try to ensure
that the prospects for policy effectiveness are maximized and the risk of

16. llorst W.J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,"
Policy Sciences, 4 (2) (June 1973): 160.
17. Romeo 0. Ocampo, "Wicked [>roblems, Government Failures: Corruption and Lesser
Evils ... Philippine Journal of Public Adminislrulion, 54 ( 1-2) (January-December 20 10): 44.
I!!. For example, Robert Klitgaard, Ronald Maclcan-Abaroa and H. Lindsey Parris.
Cormpl Cilies: A Praclical Guide /o Cure and Pre,·enlion (Oakland, CA: Institute for
Contemporary Studies, 2000) is based on the three case studies of Hong Kong, La Paz in Bolivia,
and New York City. Bertrand de Spcville, Owrcoming Cormplion: The Esselllials (Richmond,
UK: de Spcville & Associates, 2010) provides advice to policymakcrs based on his experience
as llon~t Kon~t's ICAC Commissioner from 1992-1997, The latest effort is Robert I. Rotberg,
7111! Cormplion Cure: How Cilizens ami Leaders can Combal Grc!fi (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2017), Chapters 10-11, pp. 290-312.
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policy failure minimized." 1'> This monograph provides advice to
policymakers to enhance their political will to minimize corruption and is
written for Asian policymakers and anti-corruption practitioners
concerned with enhancing the effectiveness of their ACAs. Nevertheless,
the lessons for combating corruption in Asian countries might also be
useful for policymakers in other countries if the contextual differences are
taken into account.
Asian countries employ three patterns of corruption control
depending on the number of ACAs used to enforce the anti-corruption
laws. 20 Table 2 shows that the first pattern of implementing the anticorruption laws without relying on an ACA is practised in Japan and Papua
New Guinea. The second pattern refers to Afghanistan, China, India,
Pakistan, Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam that rely on multiple ACAs to
curb corruption. The third and most popular pattern of relying on a single
ACA was pioneered by Singapore with the establishment of the Corrupt
Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) in September 1952 and replicated
in February 1974 with the formation of the Independent Commission
Against Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong. The success of the CPIB and
ICAC in minimizing corruption has promoted the belief that ACAs are
effective in combating corruption21 and led to the proliferation of nearly
150 ACAs around the world. 22
Table 2: Patterns of Corruption Control in 27 Asian Countries
Pattern
I

2

3

Features
Implementing the anticorruption
laws without an ACA
Reliance on multiple
ACAs to
implement the anticorruption laws
Reliance on a single
ACA to implement

Countries
Japan, Papua New Guinea (2)

Afghanistan, China, India, Pakistan,
Philippines. Taiwan, Vietnam (7)

Singapore. llong Kong SAR. Malaysia.
Brunei Darussalam, Nepal, Sri Lanka,
Maldives, Thailand, Macau SAR, South

19. Roben Gregory, "l'oliey Advice," in Benrand Hadie, Dirk Herg-Schlosscr and
Leonardo Morlino (Eds.). l11tenwtimral Enc,rclopedia of Political Science, (Thousand Oaks.
lA~ SaP.c Puhlicarions, 2011), p. 11!92.
20. Quah, Curbing CorniJJtion in Asian Countries, pp. 25-29.
21. UNDP. Practitioners· Guid(•: Capacity Assessmem of Ami-Cormptiotl Agencies {New
York: UNDP. 2011), p. 8.
22. Samuel De Jacgerc, "Principles for Anti-Corruption Agencies: A Game Changer,"
.limla/.Journal of Public Policy. I {I) (August2012): 80.
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Korea, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Bangladesh,
Bhutan, Mongolia, Timor-Leste,
Cambodia, Myanmar ( 18)

Source: Compiled by the author. ll1e anti-corruption stmtegies of the six Asian countries
in bold type are analyzed in this monograph.

An ACA is a specialized organization established by a government
to minimize corruption in the country. De Sousa defines an ACA as a
public funded body of "a durable nature, with a specific mission to fight
corruption and reduce the opportunity structures propitious for its
occurrence in society through prevention and repressive mcasures." 23
Following Charron, an ACA is: (I) separate ti·om other government
agencies and focuses on preventing and controlling corruption; (2) a
permanent organization: (3) funded by the government; (4) accountable
either to parliament, the ministry of justice, or the executive: (5)
responsible for disseminating information on domestic corruption to the
media and other law enforcement agencies; and (6) recognized by, and
accessible to, the general public. 2 ~ There are two types of ACAs in Asian
countries, depending on the scope of their functions: ( l) Type A: those
dedicated ACAs that perform only anti-corruption functions: and (2) Type
B: those diffused ACAs which perform both anti-corruption and noncorruption-related functions.
Type A ACAs perform these anti-corruption functions: policy
development, research, monitoring and coordination of implementation
measures; prevention of corruption in power structures: education and
awareness raising; and investigation and prosecution of corruption cases. 25
The first Type A ACA in the world is Singapore's CPIB, which was
established in September 1952, and followed by the formation of many
Type A ACAs in other Asian countries. By contrast, Type B ACAs
perform both anti-corruption and non-corruption-related functions in
Afghanistan, China, India, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Macau SAR,
Timor-Leste and South Korea. For example, the Office of the Ombudsman
(OMB) in the Philippines performs these five functions: ( l) investigation
of anomalies and inefficiency; (2) prosecution of graft cases in the Special
Anti-Graft Court; (3) administrative adjudication involving disciplinary

23. Luis de Sousa, "Anti-Corruption Agencies: Between Empowerment and Irrelevance,"

Crime. 1-tm• and Social Change, 53 (I) (February 2010): 5.
24. Nicholas Charron, "Mapping and Measuring the Impact of Anti-C'omaption Agencies:
A New Dataset for 18 Countries," (Paper presented at the New Public Management and the
Quality of Government Conference in Gotcborg, Sweden, November 13-15. 2008), p. 6.
25. Gorana Klemencic, Janez Stusek. and lncsc Gaika, Speciali::ed Anli-Curntption
lnslitutions: Rel·iew of Models (Paris: OECD, 2008), pp. 9-10.
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control of all elective and appointed officials except for members of
Congress and the Judiciary and impeachable officials; (4) provision of
assistance by public officials and employees to the public to enhance the
delivery of services; and (5) graft prevention by analyzing anti -corruption
measures and increasing public awareness and cooperation. 26
Table 2 shows that 18 Asian countries have relied on a single ACA
while seven Asian countries have relied on multiple ACAs to combat
corruption. However, because of space constraints, this monograph
focuses only on these six Asian countries: China, India and Philippines,
which rely on multiple ACAs; and Singapore, Hong Kong SAR 27 and
South Korea, which rely on a single ACA. 28 Before proceeding further, it
is necessary to analyze the policy contexts of the Asian countries and their
impact on the effectiveness of the ACAs.
II. THE POLICY CONTEXTS OF ASIAN COUNTRIES

But giving advice that works to make people better ~ff in their
own eyes requires an understanding of the social, economic,
political, religious, and cultural context ~(the people to whom
that advice is being provided. ... Despite the best of illlelllions
and a high degree ofteclmical expertise, withollt understanding
of the social context, it is e.ttraordinarily difficult to give good,
effective advice.
Lloyd J. Dumas, Janine R. Wedel and Greg Callman 2'>
Scholars have relied on the moralizing, historical, economic and
ecological approaches for studying corruption in many countries. 30
Following Riggs, who advocated the use of the ecological approach to

26. OMB, Annual Report 2008 (Quezon City: OMB. 2009), pp. 7-8.
27. !long Kong, a Special Adrninistmtivc Region (SAR) of China, is referred to as ••
country here for convenience.
28. For an analysis of the anti-corruption strategies in Japan, Taiwan, Thailand. Indonesia
and Mongolia. sec Quah, Curbing Corn1p1ion in Asian Countries. Chapters 2, 5, 8, I0 and II.
respectively. For Myanmar and Vietnam. sec Jon S.T. Quah, "Minimizing Corruption in
Myanmar: An lmrossihlc llrc.'lm?" and Rohcrt C.rcgory. "Combating Com•rtinn in Vietnam: A

Commentary,'' Asian taucalion and De••elopment Studh~v. 5 (2) (2016): 175-194, 227-243.
29. Lloyd J. Dumas, Janine R. Wedel and Greg Calhnan. Confronting Corntplion, /luiltling
Accmmtahility:

/.RSSOIIS

from the ll'or/c/ of lntemafllmal llnelopment :lclt•tsmg (New York:

Palgmve Macmillan, 2010). pp. 5-6.
30. Sec Amold J. Heidenheimer (Ed.), l'olitica/ Corn~ption: ReadinJ?.~ in Comparatit·e
Analrsis (New Brunswick, NJ: Tmnsaction Books, 1970) for examples of research on corruption
using these approaches.
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compare administrative systems, 31 the ecological approach is employed in
this study because it is more comprehensive and useful than the other three
approaches. The ecological approach in public administration is based on
"the idea that public administrators operate in an environment which
constrains them, but that what the public administrators do may, in tum,
affect the environment."32 A country's environment influences greatly the
nature of its public administration in three ways. First, the environment
determines how the civil servant perceives the problems to be solved,
identifies the alternatives for dealing with these problems, and mobilizes
the resources and support needed. Second, the clients to be served or
regulated, the interest groups and other stakeholders who may support or
oppose the policy, must be identified. Finally, the impact of the
consequences of public policies must be assessed within the constraints of
the environment. 33
Table 3: The Policy Contexts of 26 Asian Countries a
Country

Land
area

Population
(2016)

Colonial
legacy

(sq. km)

Political
system

GDPper
capita
(2016)
US$73.11!7
lJS$8,601

SAR, China
Democracy

US$52.960
US$43,61!1

Democracv
SAR,China
Constitutional
Monarchy
Democracy
Democracy
Constitutional
Monarchv
Democracy
Democracv
Communist
Democracv
Democracy
Constitutional
Monarchy
Communist
Democracv

Macau SAR
Maldives

30
298

612,170
417,490

Singapore
Bong Kong
SAR
Brunei
Darussalam
Timor-Lestc
Taiwan
Bhutan

719
1,075

5.607.280
7,346,700

Portuguese
Portuguese
Dutch,
British
British
British

6,000

423.200

British

lJS$26,931!

15,000
36,179
47,000

1,261!,670
23,540,11110
797,760

lJS$1. IS!!b
lJS$22,598b
US$2,804

Sri l.anka
South Korea
North Korea
Bangladesh
NC]'lll
Cambodia

66,000
99,274
121.000
143,991!
147,000
181,000

21.203,000
51.245,710
25.361!,620
162,951,650
28,91!2,770
15.762,370

Portue.uese
Japanese
Not
colonized
British
Japanese
Japanese
British
British
French

Lao I'DR
l'hilinnines

237,000
300,000

6,75!!,350
I03,320.220

French
Spanish

US$2,353
US$2,951

US$3,1!35
US$27,531!
No data
lJSSIJ51!
IJS$729
US$1,269

31. Fred W. Riggs, The Ecology of Public Admi11istrcuiv11 (Bombay: Asia Publishing
House, 1962), pp. 1-2.
32. Ivan L. Richardson and Sidney Baldwin, Public Admi11istratio11: Gowmmelll ;, Action
(Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1976). p. 24.
33. Ibid .• p. 24.
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Vietnam
Malaysia

331,114
332,665

92.701,100
31,187,260

Japan

377,727

126,994,510

Papua New
Guinea
Thailand

463,000

8,084,990

513.115

68,863.510

Afghanistan
Myanmar

652,000
677,000

34,656,030
52,885,220

Pakistan
Mongolia

803,940
1.565,000

193,203,480
3,027,400

Indonesia
India
China

1,904,443
3,287,263
9,560,900

261,115.460
1,324.17 m
1,378.66 m

United
States
French
British

lJS$2,185
lJS$9,502

Communist
Constitutional
Monarchy
Constitutional
Monarchy
Democracy

Not
colonized
British
Australian
Not
colonized
British
British

l!S$38,894

British
Chinese
Russian
Dutch
British
Not
colonized
b20 15 figure

lJS$1,468
US$3,686

Constitutional
Monarchy
Democracy
Transitional
Democracy
Democracy
Democracy

US$3,570
lJS$1,709
US$8,123

Democmcy
Democmcv
Communist

lJS$2,268
(2014)
US$5,907
US$561
lJS$1.275

•Hong Kong and Macau arc SARs of China.
Sources: Economist, Pockel World in Figures 20/6 /:"clition (London: Profile Books, 20 15 ),
various pages: World Bank. "Population, total," Washin1,'1on. DC, available at:
hnp://data.worldbank.orglindicator/SP.POP.TOTL and World Bank, "GDP per
capita(current USS)," Washington, DC, available at: hnp://data. worldbank.orglindicator/
NY.GDP.PCAPCO (both accessed August 8, 2017).

The study of how Asian countries combat corruption must begin with
an analysis of their policy contexts, which refer to the geographical,
historical, economic, demographic, cultural, political and legal aspects of
their environments that influence the formulation, implementation and
evaluation of their anti-corruption measures. 34 The "fragile" nature of
those Asian countries with high scores on the Fragile States Index (FSI)
2016 constitutes a serious obstacle to their anti-corruption efforts. The
importance of considering the policy context in solving public
administration problems was recognized by Fukuyama who observed that
"most good solutions" to these problems must "incorporate a great deal of
context -spcci fie information. " 35

A. Geographical Constraints
As geography is derived from a Greek word meaning a "description
of the earth," Kaplan observes that "man's actions arc limited by the
physical parameters imposed by geography" which serves as "a major

34. Qua h. ( "urbing Con·uption in Asian Coumrie.~. pp. 30-31.
35. Francis Fukuyama, State Building: Gorermmce am/World Order in the
Century (London: Profile Books, 2004), p. 58.

Twemy-Fir.~t
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constraint on-and instigator of-the actions of states." Jc, It is not
accidental that the poorest countries in the world arc located "where
geography, by way of soil suitability, supports high population densities,
but not economic growth-because of distance from ports and
railhcads.'' 37 Land-locked countries which are resource-scarce and located
between "neighbors who either do not have opportunities or do not take
them" arc condemned to "the slow lane." 38 Lacking access to the sea,
being land-locked exacerbates the constraints on a country's economic,
political and social development. 39 The five Asian countries which are
land-locked are Afghanistan, Bhutan, Lao People's Democratic Republic
(PDR), Mongolia and Nepal.
A country's size defined in terms of its land area is an important
factor affecting the effectiveness of an ACA because a large country or
archipelago encounters more problems in implementing anti-conuption
laws in the provinces or outer islands than a small country or city-state.
This means that Macau SAR, Singapore and Hong Kong SAR, which are
among the smallest territories shown in Table 3, have encountered fewer
problems in enforcing anti-corruption laws than China, which is the largest
Asian country with a land area of 9,560,900 sq. km, and the third largest
country in the world after Russia and Canada. 40
Apart from its land area, a country's geographical location can
promote or hinder its efforts in combating conuption. China shares its
borders with 14 countries including Afghanistan, Bhutan, India,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, North
Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Vietnam. China is located in a
"bad neighborhood" with its neighbors, except Bhutan, having high
perceived levels of conuption, according to the CPI in 2016. 41

36. Robert D. Kaplan, The Re1·enJ.!e of Geography: What the Map tells 11s aho11t Coming
Cmljlict.l' and the Bailie against Fate (New York: Random llouse, 2(}12), pp. xix, 29.
37. Ibid., p. 32.
38. Paul Collier, The Bouom /Jillion: Why the Poorest Colllltries are Failing and What can
he Done aholll it (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 55-57.
39. Keith McLachlan. "Introduction," in Dick Hodder. Sarah J. Lloyd and Keith
Mclachlan (Eds.), l.and-/.Qcked Sttlles ofAfrictl and Asia (london: Frank Ca~s. 1998). p. 3.
40. Economist, Pocket World in Figures 2016/:."dition (london: l,rofile Books, 2015). pp.
14. 132.
41. "Corruption Perceptions Index 2016," Berlin, available at: https://www.transparency.
orglnews/featurclcorruption_perceptions_index_20 16 (accessed January 25, 20 17).
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B. Colonial Legacy

Fonnative historical experiences arc "those circumstances in the past
with significant transference to the immediate environment" 42 of anticorruption policy. The most important fonnative historical experience
influencing the implementation of their governments' anti-corruption
measures today in many Asian countries is their colonial legacy. Except
for Bhutan, China, Japan and Thailand, which have not been colonized,
Table 4 shows that the other 22 Asian countries were colonized by these
ten countries: Australia, Britain, China, France, Japan, Netherlands,
Portugal, Russia, Spain and the United States. Tan contends that the
colonial heritage of the Asian countries is an important factor influencing
their subsequent development. Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and
Taiwan have benefited from the infrastructural development, educational
attainment and commercial development initiated by their colonial
governments. However, those South and Southeast Asian countries, which
were acquired to extract raw materials, or to produce cash crops for
exports, did not benefit from their colonial heritage. 43
The British colonial legacy in Singapore has been more positive than
the Dutch colonial legacy in Indonesia. The British "invested heavily in
roads, railways and harbors, and educated the local populations in their
colonies in the language of international trade, science and technology,
English." 44 They built a modem transport system from the north of
Malaya to the south in Singapore, which served as the major port through
which raw materials were shipped, and manufactured goods were
imported. Accordingly, extensive port and storage facilities, shipchandlery and bunkering facilities, and banking and insurance industries
were developed by the British to service the many ships passing through
Singapore and to provide financial services for the importers and
exporters. The British system of justice and public administration was
established in Malaya and Singapore to provide the legal and
administrative framework for commerce. 45 According to Lange, Hong
Kong and Singapore have "the most impressive developmental

42. Donald P. Warwick, "Cultural Values and Population Policies: Cases and Contexts.'' in
John D. Montgomery, Harold D. Lasswell and Joel S. Migdal (Eds.), Pallems of Policy:
Compamtil'f! and Longiflldinal Studies of Pop11latiot1 1-:l'etlts (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
Books, 19791, p. 307.
43. Gerald Tan, Asian Dew!lopmem: At1 lmrodllctiofl to Economic. Social am/ l'olitiml
Clumge ifl rbia (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 20001, pp. 19 and 21.
44. Ibid., p. II.
45. Ibid., p. 12.
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improvements among all former British colonies over the past fifty
years."46
Table 4: Colonial Status of Asian Countries
Colonizer
Australia
Britain

China
France
Jaoan
Netherlands
Portugal
Russia
Soain
United States
Not colonized

Countries
Paoua New Guinea
Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Hong Kong
SAR, India, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan,
Paoua New Guinea, Singapore. Sri Lanka
Mongolia
Cambodia, Lao PDR. Vietnam
North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan
Indonesia
Macau SAR, Timor-Lcstc
Mongolia
Philippines
Philippines
Bhutan, China, Japan. Thailand

Source: Compiled by the author

During the 17'h to 18'h centuries, Britain adopted "a pragmatic
approach to corruption" as these "founding fathers of British power" Francis Bacon, Samuel Pepys and Warren Hastings - had "contentedly
accepted bribes and never felt a twinge of shame in their souls." 47
However, Treisman found that former British colonies with common law
legal systems had significantly lower perceived corruption because of their
"superior administration of justice" and their "preoccupation with
procedural fairness even at the expense of social hierarchy.''-'M However,
this does not apply to all the 11 former British colonies in Asia but only to
Hong Kong and Singapore, which have benefited from the tradition of
meritocracy introduced by the British with the establishment of the Public
Service Commissions in both territories in 1950 and 1951 respectively,
because recruitment and promotion in their civil services are based on
merit and not patronage. 49 Singapore's economic development is the result

46. Matthew Lange, l.ineages of Despotism am/ Dt•l't'lopment: British Colonialism and
State Power (Chieago,IL: University of Chicago Press, 2009), p. 189.
47. Brioschi, Cormptimr. p. 93.
48. Daniel Treisman, 11re Causes ofCormption: A Cross-National Stul~\' (los Angeles.
CA: Department of Political Science, University ofCalifomia at Los Angeles, 2000), pp. 31-32
and 46.
49. Quah, Curbing Corruption in Asian Cou111ries, pp. 202 and 240.
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of its "highly effective bureaucratic state with relatively high levels of
inclusiveness." 50
By contrast, the Dutch did not invest in infrastructure or educate the
local population because they were interested in Indonesia for its raw
materials and spices. 5 1 Furthermore, unlike the British, the Dutch did not
introduce the tradition of meritocracy because they did not rely on merit
to recruit the local civil servants, who were selected by hereditary
succession. 52 Consequently, the Dutch did not leave behind a "workable
model of public administration, and had done little to train Indonesians for
responsible positions." 53 The absence of meritocracy in Indonesia's
public bureaucracy is reflected in the importance of patronage in the
recruitment and promotion of civil servants and has increased their
vulnerability to corruption and weakens their capacity to implement public
policies effectively. 54
The Philippines was colonized by Spain from I 565 to 1898 and by
the United States from 1898 to I946. The Spanish colonial administration
was concerned with two aspects: commercial profit and spreading its
religion. Corruption was introduced to the Philippines by the Spanish as
the "low salaries and poor working conditions of the bureaucrats and the
many opportunities available for corrupt behavior contributed to the
widespread corruption in the colonial bureaucracy."55 A public office was
viewed as a grant or favor from the King during the Spanish colonial
period and "many bureaucrats actually treated the transaction as a business
-selling an office at a profit and buying a more lucrative one."56 Thus, it
is not surprising that the Spanish colonial bureaucracy's most serious
weakness was the "internal moral corruption of its members." 57
50. Lange, Lineages of Despotism and Dewlopment. p. 189.
51. Tan, Asicm Dewlopment. p. 13.
52. Quah, Curbing Corn1ption in Asian Countries. p. 361. See also Agus Pramusinto,
"Weak Central Authority and Fragmented Burcaucmcy: A Study of Policy Implementation in
Indonesia," in Jon S.T. Quah (Ed.), The Role of the Public Bureaucracy in Poliq·
Implementation in Fin• :I SEAN Countries (Cambridge. UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
pp. 135-136.
53. Donald P. Warwick, Civil Sen·ice Rtform in Indonesia: Problems and Possibilities
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Institute for Jntemational Development, unpublished confidential
report, 1978), p. 3.
54. Quah, Curbing Cormption in Asian Cormtries. p. 363.
55. Jon S.T. Quah, "Burcaucmtic Corruption in the ASEAN Countries: A Comparative
Analysis of their Anti-Corruption Strategies," Journal ofSoutheast Asian Sllulie.1·, I 3 (I) (March
1982): 158.
56. Jose N. Endriga, "Historical Notes on Grall and Corruption in the Philippines,"
PhilippineJormwl tJf/'ub/ic Administration, 23 (3-4) ( 1979): 247-249.
57. Onofre D. Corpuz, The Bureaucraq in the Philippines (Manila: Institute of Public
Administration, University ofthc Philippines, 1957), p. 129.
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Unlike the Spanish, the Americans adopted a secular colonial policy
that provided the Filipinos with more opportunities for participating in the
affairs of their country. This was reflected in the creation of a modern civil
service by the Americans and their efforts to localize it. The First
Philippine Commission recommended the formation of an efficient and
non-partisan civil service in 1899. On September 19, 1900, the Second
Philippine Commission passed an act for the establishment and
maintenance of an efticient and honest civil service in the Philippines. 58 In
short, an important legacy of American colonial bureaucracy is the
introduction of meritocracy in the Philippines. It should also be noted that
the American colonial bureaucracy was incorrupt because the bureaucrats
received higher salaries and corrupt ofticials were promptly prosecuted. 5'1
Unfortunately, these two positive aspects of American colonial rule in the
Philippines have not endured after the attainment of independence in July
1946 because the contemporary public bureaucracy is afflicted by rampant
corruption and relies on patronage rather than merit in the recruitment and
promotion of civil servants. The cultural value of lllang na loob or debt of
gratitude, promotes nepotism in the Philippines because public officials
readily perform favors for their relatives, including the appointment of
unqualified persons. 60 As Filipino parents expect their children to be
"forever grateful" to them, their children's zllang tza loob to them "should
be immeasurable and eternal."61
The French consolidated their influence in Indochina from the middle
of the 19111 century and in 1887, a unified French colonial administration
was established in Indochina and marked the culmination of French
colonial rule in Southeast Asia. They monopolized economic activity in
Indochina and controlled most of its finance and trade. In 1906, they
introduced French education and also established tertiary education.
However, unlike the British, the French "did little to develop their
Southeast Asian colonies, and concentrated on the export of primary
products from these territories.''62 Instead of emphasizing the training of
civil servants like the British, the French introduced political and
administrative institutions in Indochina by imposing "a complex system

5!!. Ibid .• p. 191.
59. Endriga... Historical Notes on Graft and Corruption in the Philippines," 254.
60. Quah, Curbing Corruption in Asian Coulllries. p. 132.
61. Tomas D. Andres, Understanding Filipino Values: A Mcmagement Approach (Quezon
City: New Day l'ublishcrs, I9K I), p. 25.
62. Tan, Asian Development. p. 15.
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of direct and indirect colonial rule which transferred few important
government skills to indigenous persons."t>J
During the colonial period, the rural Vietnamese in central and
northern Vietnam were governed by the mandarinate and village officials.
However, by the end of the colonial period, the village structures that had
moderated their behavior degenerated and contributed to "unprecedented
levels of corruption, nepotism and patron-clientism."64 The French did not
train and promote Vietnamese civil servants to higher administrative
positions except "in the field where they had little actual authority or
responsibility commensurate with their positions." Consequently, the
departure of the French administrative personnel when Vietnam became
independent left a huge vacuum because the Vietnamese officials who
replaced them had little administrative experience. 65 In other words, apart
from introducing education, the French did not invest in infrastructure,
introduce meritocracy or provide training for the Vietnamese civil
servants.
Portuguese penetration of Asia began when Vasco da Gama reached
the south western coast of India. 66 The Portuguese "began using Macao
regularly" in 155567 and administered it from 155768 until December 20,
1999, when it was returned to the People's Republic of China after 442
years of Portuguese colonial rule. Portuguese colonialism in Asia and
Africa was described as "royal, authoritarian, and commercial." 69
Portugal's colonial administration was based on the four principles of
political unity, spiritual assimilation, administrative differentiation, and
economic solidarity. 70 However, corruption, bribery and smuggling
flourished in the Portuguese empire because the colonial governors and

63. Frank C. Darling. 7111! Westernization of Asia: A Comparatiw Political Analysis
(Cambridge. MA: Schenk man Publishing Company, 1980). pp. 128. 131.
64. John Gilkspie. "The Political-Legal Culture of Anti-Corruption Reforms in Vietnam.''
in Tim Lindsey and Howard Dick (Eds.), Cormption in Asia: Rethinkin~ the G01·emance
f>amdigm (Annandale. NSW: Federation Press. 2002). p. 174.
65. D.L Rose and V.H. Vu. 111e l'ielllcJme.n• Cil'il Sen·ice -~\·stem (East Lansing. Ml:
Vietnam Advisory Group, Michigan State University. 1961 ). p. I.
66. Tan, Asian /Je1·elopment. p. 15.
67. J.M. Bmga, 7111! Westem Pioneers am/their /JisccJ\'ery of Macao (Macau: lmprensa
Nacional. 1949), p. 102.
6!!. Steve Shipp, Macau. China: A Politicalllistory c~fthe Porlllguese Colony's Transition
to Chinese Rule (Jefferson. NC: Mcfarland & Company. 1997), p. I.
n9. Bailey W. Diffie ami George D. Winius. FoundtJtions oftlle l'onugu,•se /;'mpire. 1·1151580 (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 1977). p. 301.
70. Marcelo Caetano. "Principles and Mcth(l<l~ of Portuguese Colonial Administration," in
/'rincip/es and Methods of Colonial Aclminhtration (London: Bullcrworths Scientific
Publications, 1950), p. 86.
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overseas officials were overworked and underpaid and "had every
incentive to seek alternative forms of income-particularly since they
often were forced to draw upon personal funds in order to fulfil their
overseas assignments. " 71
Macau was an example of a settler-dominated colony because the
Portuguese came to live and work there as proprietors and rulers and not
as farmers. 72 The legacy of Portuguese colonialism in Macau was
threefold. First, Portuguese became the lingua franca and Catholicism was
the religion adopted by all the colonies, including Macau, as one of the
aims of the colonial administration was the "spiritual assimilation" of the
local population. n Second, the constitution and major institutions,
including the Macau Civil Service and its personnel system arc based on
the Portuguese model with no major differences because "the principles
are the same." 74 The third and most important legacy was "that the
government of Portuguese Asia was notorious for its corruption" because
"surrounded by sickness, poverty, and death, by strange customs,
incredible opulence, and easy companions eager to compromise the
newcomer," many Portuguese settlers with "basically good morals slipped
them off on the eastward voyage, only to dress in them again" if they ever
returned home. However, while they were in Asia, "the trick was to move
from one office to a grander one every triennium and to invest the
dishonest gains from one in the illicit opportunities peculiar to the next." 75
Furthermore, "personal connections also played vital roles in the
fraud and corruption that plagued the Portuguese empire during this era." 76
Many aspects of Portuguese society, including "patronage and
paternalism, corruption and fraud, commerce and trade, cross-cultural
communication and exchange" were interrelated and reflected the
"personal nature of the Portuguese social world and the role of social
networks in Portuguese society." 77 A major cause of bureaucratic
corruption in Macau was the Portuguese style of colonial governance,
which had "an inefficient and parasitic administrative structure," with

71. Erik Lars Myrup. Power and Cormption in the J:'ar~l' Modern J>m·111~11ese World (Baton
Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 20 15), p. 4.
72. S.E. Finer, 11re 1/istory of G01-ernme111 from the Earliest Times. Vol. Ill (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 1378.
73. Braga. The We.uem Pioneers and their /)iscm·ery of Macao. p. 145.
74. Wong Cham Li, "The Public Personnel System in Macau," Asian Jo11ma/ of P11blic
Administration. 12 (2)(Dcccmber 1990): 176.
75. Diffie and Winius, Fo11ndations ofthe l'ortllgllese Empire. /415-1580, p. 419.
76. Myrup, Power am/ Corruption in th'' Ear(!• Modem Portu~uese World. p. 171.
77. Ibid, pp. 174-175.
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many civil servants who were "morally inadequate" and corrupt, and a
highly politicized civil service. 78 The civil service was politicized because
the Portuguese politicians occupying senior positions recruited and
promoted assistants or middle-level bureaucrats on the basis of political
considerations instead of merit. 79
Portuguese colonial rule in Timor-Leste was "often brutal and
exploitative" because it was primarily extractive with the export of
sandalwood and coffee and limited investment in infrastructure, health and
education. Indonesia's invasion of Timor-Leste in 1975 exacerbated the
situation because it incorporated "the pervasive and systemic corruption"
in Indonesia into the administration of its 27th province. 80 The absence of
Timorese officials among the senior bureaucrats in Timor-Leste during
Indonesia's occupation and the rudimentary public infrastructure were two
important obstacles encountered by the United Nations in its etTorts to
develop Timor-Leste's administration after the attainment of
independence in May 2002. 81
C. Economic Development

There is a great deal of disparity in the level of economic
development of the Asian countries as reflected in their gross domestic
product (GOP) per capita, which ranges from US$561 for Afghanistan to
US$73, 187 for Macau SAR, as shown in Table 3. Among the 27 Asian
countries included in Transparency International's CPI in 2016, Table 5
shows that there is a strong association between their CPI scores and GOP
per capita in 20 16 because, with the exception of Bhutan, the other six
countries with CPI scores of 50 and above have GOP per capita ranging
from US$22,598 for Taiwan to US$52,960 for Singapore.
ACAs must be provided with the required personnel, budget and
operational autonomy to enable them to perform their functions
effectively. This means that combating corruption is expensive because
the government has to provide the ACA with an adequate budget and
sufficient personneJ.H 2 The governments in countries with high GOP per
78. Lo Shiu Hing, l'olitical De•·e/opme11t ill Macau (Hong Kong: Chinese Uni\'ersity Press,
1995), p. 176.
79. Ibid., p. 177.
80. Benjamin Allen and Edward Anderson, Corruptio11 Assessment: Timor-/.este
(Washington, DC: Management Systems International and US Agency for International
Development, September 15, 2009), p. I.
81. Ibid., p. I.
82. Jon S.T. Quah, "The Criticallmponancc of J>olitical Will in Combating Corruption in
Asian Countries." Public Administmtio11 and l'o/icr: A11 Asia-Pacific Journal. Ill (2) (Fall
2015): 13.
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capita will be able to allocate the resources needed by their ACAs for
combating corruption and to pay adequate salaries to their civil servants to
minimize petty corruption. This means that poor countries like
Afghanistan and Nepal will require financial and technical assistance in
fighting corruption from international organizations like the UNDP, the
World Bank and other donor agencies. For example, Afghanistan was the
top recipient oftechnical and financial assistance from the UNDP in 2011
with US$492.5 millionY
Table 5: CPI Scores and GDP Per Capita of 27 Asian Countries in
2016
Country

No.

I
2
3
4

5
6
7
8
l)

10
II
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
'2015

Singapore
Hong Kong SAR
Japan
Bhutan
Taiwan
Brunei Darussalam
South Korea
Malaysia
China
India
Mongolia
Indonesia
Maldives
Sri Lanka
Philippines
Thailand
Tirnor-Lestc
Vietnam
Pakistan
Lao PDR
Ncnal
Myanmar
Papua New Guinea
Bangladesh
Cambodia
AfL'hanistan
North Korea
figure. ~014 figure.

CPI 2016
Rank&
Score
7'h (84)
IS'h (77)
2()'h (72)
27'h (65)
31" (61)
41" (58)
52 00 (53)
ss•h (49)
79'h (40)
79'" (40)
87'" (38)
90'" (37)
95'h (36)
95'h (36)
101" (35)
101''(35)
101" (35)
IIJ'h (33)
116'h (32)
123'd (30)
131 51 (29)
1361h (28)
136'h (28)
145'h (26)
156'h (21)
169'h (15)
174'h(12)

lB. UNDP, Annual Rqmrt 101/110/2: The Suswina/Jie

UNDP, 2012), p. 36.

l·illllrt.'

GOP per
capita 2016
US$52.960
US$43,681
US$38.894
USS2.X04
US$22.598"
US$26.938
US$27.538
US$9,502
US$8,123
US$1,709
US$3,6X6
US$3,570
US$8,601
US$3,835
US$2,951
US$5.907
US$1.158•
US$2,185
US$1.46!!
US$2,353
US$729
US$1.275
USS2.268b
US$1,35!!
US$1.269
US$561
No data

We Watll (New York:
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Sources: Transparency International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2016" and World
Bank, "GDP per capita (current US$)," Washington DC, available at:
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAPCO (accessed August 8, 2017).

D. Population and Culture

The size of a country's population is an important factor influencing
an ACA's output as the ACAs in countries with larger populations would
receive more corruption complaints than their counterparts with smaller
populations. This is clearly shown in Table 6, which compares the number
of complaints received by the Commission Against Corruption (CAC) in
Macau SAR and the OMB in the Philippines from 2006 to 20JO.H 4 The
OMB's average number of 12,685 complaints per year during 2006-2010
is 16 times more than the CAC's average of 795 complaints per year
during the same period.
Table 6: Complaints received by Macau's CAC and
Philippines' OMB, 2006-2010
Anti-Corruption
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010 Average
A2ency
736
796
840
923
681
Commission Against
795
Corruption Macau
SAR
10,824
13,602
13,205
12,736
13,057
12,685
Office of the
Ombudsman
Philippines
Sources: CAC, Ammal Repor/ 2010 (Macau: CAC, 2011 ), p. II; OMB. Annual Reporl
2009 (Quezon City: OMB, 2010), p. 32; and OMB, Annual Repor/ 2010 (Quezon City:
OMB, 2011), p. 5.

Apart from its size, the ethnic diversity of the population and its
cultural values and practices also affect the perceived extent of corruption
and the ACA's effectiveness in curbing corruption. Corruption is viewed
with different levels of tolerance in various countries. In Thailand, the
population's tolerant attitude toward corruption constitutes an important
obstacle to the government's anti-corruption strategy. There is no
equivalent word for corruption in the Thai language because Thais do not
view corruption as harmful to the public interest. The closest Thai
equivalent for corruption is choh rat bang luang, meaning "to defraud the
state" or stealing from the King, which is risky but not perceived as an

84. These two ACAs arc comparable because both perform the functions of an Ombudsman
too.
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erosion of the public interest. 85 Since "nobody is hurt by corruption,"
Thais tolerate corruption as a way of life and "unlike Westerners, they
expect their leaders to be corrupt too, and accept the fact as part of life. " 86
In addition to their tolerance for corruption, many Thais also "cringed with
embarrassment" if important people arc humiliated. Consequently, this
explains why "Thais are not used to seeing people who used to be in
authority treated like dirt in that way" 87 and why coup leaders arc not
punished but ignored if they are unsuccessful.
The Thai population's tolerance for corrupt practices is reflected in
their identification of these seven levels, which are ranked from less to
more severe misconduct, with the first three levels deemed as acceptable
practices and the remaining four levels as unacceptable practices: (I) Sin
nam jai (gift of goodwill); (2) Khan am ron nam cha (tea money); (3)
Praplwetmi clwb (improper behavior); (4) Sin bon (bribery); (5) Rith thai
(extortion); (6) Tlwt jarit tor nathi (dishonesty in duty); and (7) Kan
klwrrapclwan (corruption). 88 For most Thais, the first level ofsinnamjai
is not viewed as corruption because "namjai or 'good will from the heart'
is highly valued as a personal attribute in Thai culture" and if inexpensive
gifts are given by people to show their appreciation for the service they
have received. 89 In other words, the Thai population's tolerance for
corruption is explained by the widespread practice of gift-giving by the
public to otlicials for services rendered to supplement their low salaries. 90
Furthermore, to enhance their promotion prospects, civil servants give
gifts to their superiors because favoritism is more important than merit in
determining their career advancement. 91

85. Niels Mulder, Inside Thai Society: lnteqm!tation of Everyday l.ife (Amsterdam: Pepin
Press,l996),p.l74.
86. Elliot Kulick and Dick Wilson. Thailand's Tum: Profile ofa New Dragcm (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1992), p. 36.
87. Victor Mallet, The Trouble with Tigers: 711C Rise and Fall ofSoutheast Asia (london:
HarperCollins Publishers, 1999), p. 229.
88. Sakkarin Niyomsilpa. The l'olitiml Economy of Telecomnumicatimrs Reforms
(London: Pinter, 2000), pp. 141-142.
89. Pasuk Phongpaichit and Sungsidh Piriyamngsan, Corntption am/ !Jcmocracr in
1'/wi/wrd. zoo edition (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1996), pp. 166-167.
90. Quah, Curbing Corruption in Asian Countries, p. 290.
91. Likhit Dhimvegin, "The Thai Bureaucratic Elite: A Study of their Promotion and
Career Advancement Patterns," in Peter S.J. Chen and llans Dieter Evers (Eds.), Swdies in
ASF.AN Sociology· Urban Society and Social Change (Singapore: Chapmen Enterprises, 1978),
pp. 97-98.
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E. Political and Legal Systems
The political system is perhaps the most important aspect of a
country's policy context because of the nature of political leadership and
the strength of its political will to combat corruption. Treisman observes
that "a long duration of democracy appeared necessary to significantly
reduce corruption"92 because democracy also provides citizens with "an
opportunity to punish governments that fail to control corruption." 9·1
However, Rose-Ackerman has noted that "in democracies the desire for
re-election will deter corruption so long as the electorate disapproves of
the practice and has some way of sorting out valid from invalid
accusations. " 94
Countries which have undergone a peaceful transfer of power
through free and fair elections are more likely to be effective in combating
corruption than those regimes which have assumed power through conflict
or a military coup. Post-conflict countries like Cambodia, Nepal, Papua
New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste and Vietnam, which have endured
protracted periods of civil war, arc "particularly vulnerable" to corruption
because of the combined effect of"thc legacy of wartime occupation," the
management and distribution of "massive influxes of material wealth"
from natural resources or foreign aid, and the "overall weakness of the
state."95
Related to their political systems are the legal systems of Asian
countries which are influenced by their colonial heritage and are based on
the common law or civil law systems or a combination of both systems
with other influences. Asian countries which are former British colonies
usually adopt the common law system with these four features: (I) there
is no written constitution or codified laws; (2) judicial decisions are
binding; (3) there is extensive freedom of contract; and (4) everything is
permitted that is not expressly prohibited by law. By contrast, Asian
countries following a civil law system are former French, Dutch, German,
Spanish or Portuguese colonies with these four features: ( 1) there is a
written constitution based on specific codes: (2) legislative enactments are
binding; (3) there is less freedom of contract; and (4) there arc

92. Treisman, The Causes of Corrnptio11, pp. 40-41.
93. /\sparisim Ghosh, "Corruption: Refom1's Dark Side," Far Easteml:.i:onomic Rel'ie11·.
March 20, 1997, p. 20.
94. Susan Rose-Ackerman. "Democracy and 'Gnmd' Corruption," lmematiotJal !.'ocial
Scie11ce Journal. /49 (1996): 376.
95. Samh Dix and Nihal Jayawickrama, Fightillg CorntpliotJ i11 Post-CotJjlict am/ Recol't'l')'
Simatio11s: /.earning from the Past (New York: UNDP. June 2010), pp. x-xi.
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constitutional court, administrative court and civil court systems to review
the consistency oflegislation and administrative acts. 96
A country's legal system is an important factor influencing the
effectiveness of its ACA because it specifies the nature of the anticorruption laws and the ACA 's legal powers and independence. In
Singapore, the Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) of 1960 and its
subsequent amendments provide details of the powers ofthe CPIB. 97 The
powers of Hong Kong's ICAC arc specified in the ICAC Ordinance of
1974 and the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO) of 1971. 98 As
Singapore and Hong Kong are former British colonies, they adopted the
English common law system with the inclusion of shariah law for
Muslims in Singapore and Chinese customary law in Hong Kong.
However, countries with a civil law system would need to make
structural changes to adopt a CPIB or ICAC-style ACA. For example,
President MA Ying-jeou ofTaiwan responded to the July 14, 2010 arrest
of three high court judges and a district prosecutor for bribery by reversing
his earlier decision of not establishing an ACA. 99 On July 20, 2010, he
announced that "the new agency would not be a carbon copy" ofthe ICAC
or CPIB, and would come under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice
(MOJ), but not report directly to the President. 100 President Ma missed the
golden opportunity of improving the effectiveness of Taiwan's anticorruption measures when the Agency Against Corruption (AAC) was
established as part of the MOJ in July 2011. As the CPIB and ICAC are
the most effective Asian ACAs, it is puzzling why President Ma did not
want to emulate these ACAs in view of his desire to curb corruption
effectively in Taiwan. 101 He did not explain his decision but one reason is
that Taiwan's civil law system based on the German model requires
changes in government structure to establish an independent ACA like the
CPIB and ICAC. The other more important reason was President Ma's
lack of support from his party, the Kuomintang, which was responsible for

96. World Bank, "Key Features of Common Law or Civil Law Systems," Washington DC,
available at: www.ppp.worldbank.org/publie-private-partnershipllegislation-regulation/
framework-assessmentllcgal-systcms/comm on-vs-civil-law (accessed February 10, 2017).
97. Quah, Curbing Corntption in Asian Countries, pp. 219-221.
98. Jeremiah K.H. Wong, "The ICAC and its Anti-Corruption Measures," in Rance P.L.
Lee (Ed.), Corntption and /Is Control in Hong Kong: Situatiom· up to lhe late !'i'eventies (Hong
Kong: Chinese University Press, 1981 ), pp. 51-59.
99. Jon S.T. Quah, Taiwan :5 Anti-Corntption SJrategy: Suggestions/or Reform (Baltimore,
MD: School of Law, University of Maryland, 2010), p. 89.
100. Ho Ai Li, "Taiwan to set up agency to fight graft," Straits Times. July 21,2010, p. Al8.
101. Jon S.T. Quah, "Evaluating the Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Agencies in Five
Asian Countries," Asian Education and Development Studies, 4 (l) (2015): 154-155.
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the rampant spread of "black gold" politics and vote-buying under the
leadership of President LEE Teng-hui ( 1988-2000). 102
F.

Difficult Governance Environment of Fragile States

As the effectiveness of ACAs also depends on their "enabling
environment," 103 the difficult governance environment of the most fragile
Asian countries constitutes a serious obstacle to the effective
implementation of their anti-corruption strategies. The difficult
governance environment of these fragile states is reflected in their high
levels of corruption, political instability, government ineffectiveness, and
low level of the rule of law. Table 7 shows that among the 25 Asian
countries 104 included in the FSI 2016, only Singapore, Japan and South
Korea have "Very Stable" scores of 32.9, 35.1 and 36.1, respectively.
Conversely, the remaining 22 countries have higher FSI scores, ranging
from 56.6 for Mongolia to I 07.9 for Afghanistan. Table 7 also confirms
that Singapore, Japan and South Korea have higher CPI scores and
percentile ranks for political stability, government effectiveness, and rule
of law than North Korea, Myanmar, Pakistan and Afghanistan which are
the four most fragile Asian countries.
Table 7: Difficult Governance Environment of
25 Asian Countries, 2016
Country

FSI2016
Rank and
Score

CPI2016
Rank and
Score

Political
stability
2016

Government
effectiveness
2016

Rule or
law
2016

Singapore

18/178
(32.9/120)
22/178
(35.1/120)
231178
(36.11120)
51/178
(56.6/120)
56/178
(62.0/120)
64/178

7/176
(84/100)
20/176
(72/100)
52/176
(53/100)
87/176
(38/100)
41/176
(581100)
55/176

99.5

100.0

96.2

86.2

95.7

88.5

51.9

80.8

86.1

73.3

50.5

46.6

93.8

81.3

73.1

50.0

76.0

71.2

Japan
S. Korea
Mongolia
Brunei
Darussalam
Malavsia

102. Editorial, "What is really the 'lee way'?" Taipei Times. March 15, 2000, p. 8; and J.
Bmce Jacobs and 1-hao Ben Liu, "lee Teng-hui and the Idea of Taiwan," China Quarter(r. 190
(June 2007): 392.
I 03. UNDP, Capacity Assessmetll ofAmi-Corruption Agencies, p. 27.
104. Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR and Taiwan are excluded in the FSI2016.
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(49/100)
(66.11120)
52.9
57.2
51.4
113/176
73/178
(33/100)
(70.7/120)
40.9
36.1
60.0
95/176
88/178
Maldives
(36/100)
(74.0/120)
46.2
67.8
27.1
79/176
92/178
China
(40/100)
(74.9/120)
38.9
53.4
90/176
33.3
93/178
Indonesia
(37/100)
(74.9/120)
68.3
70.2
27/176
82.9
Bhutan
101/178
(65/100)
(77.6/120)
15.7
66.3
55.3
101/176
105/178
Thailand
(35/100)
(78.8/120)
52.4
57.2
79/176
14.3
109/178
India
(40/100)
(79.6/120)
24.0
62.4
39.4
1241178
123/176
Lao PDR
(84.4/120)
(30/100)
I 0.0
51.9
36.5
101/176
125/178
Philippines
(35/100)
(84.7/120)
24.5
1361176
29.0
23.6
Papua New
129/178
(28/100)
(86.2/120)
Guinea
156/176
133/178
52.4
24.5
12.5
Cambodia
(21/100)
(87.41120)
44.7
136/178
95/176
49.5
54.3
Sri Lanka
(36/100)
(87.7/120)
145/176
30.8
143/178
10.5
25.5
Bangladesh
(261100)
(90.7/120)
Timor-Leste
144/178
1011176
43.3
13.9
10.1
(35/100)
(90.81120)
Nepal
146/178
1311176
19.0
19.7
19.7
(291100)
(91.21120)
North Korea
149/178
174/176
21.9
3.8
3.4
(93.91120)
( 121100)
Myanmar
136/176
1531178
23.3
16.3
16.8
(96.3/120)
(28/100)
Pakistan
1651178
1161176
1.4
28.8
20.2
101.7/120)
(321100)
169/17(1
Arghanistan
1701178
1.0
9.6
3.8
(107.91120)
( 15/100)
Sources: World Bank, "Worldwide Governance Indicators 2016," Washington, DC,
available at: http://info.worldbank.orglgovcmancclwgi/llreports (accessed October l!,
2017); Tmnsparcncy International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2016"; and Titc Fund
for Peace, "Fragile States Index 2016," Washington, DC, available at: hnp://library.
fundforpcacc.orglfsi 16-rcport (accessed August 8, 2017).
Vietnam
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Ill. COMBATING CORRUPTION WITH A SINGLE
ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCY (ACA)
Each State Par~v shall ... ensure the existence of a body or
bodies or persons specialized in combating corruption through
law et!forcement. Such boc{l' or bodies or persons shall be
granted the necessmy independence ... to be able to cany out
theirfunctions effectively and without any undue it!fluence. Such
persons or sta,ff of such bol{l' or bodies should have the
appropriate training and resources to carry out their tasks.

Article 36, UNCAC 105
A. Singapore's Effective Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau
(CPIB)

Corruption was a serious problem in Singapore during the British
colonial period but is no longer a problem today, thanks to the CPIB's
effectiveness, which is reflected in its ranking as the least corrupt Asian
country with a CPI score of 84 in 2016, and its consistently high
performance on the other indicators of the perceived extent of corruption
in 2016 as shown in Table 8. Its effectiveness is also confirmed by its 100
percent conviction rate and the CPIB Public Perceptions Survey's finding
that 89 percent of the I,0 II respondents had rated Singapore positively on
its efforts in controlling the corruption situation in 2016. ux.
Table 8: Singapore's Performance on Corruption Indicators, 2016
Indicator
Control of Corruption
Corruption Perceptions Index
PERC Corruption Survev
Diversion of Public Funds
Irregular Pavments and Bribes
Organized Crime
Ethical Behavior of Firms
Public Trust in Politicians

Sl01~apore's

Performance

2.1 (97.1)
7'h/176 (IWI 00)
1"/16 (1.67/10)
3'd/138 (6.217)
3'd/138 (6.7/7)
7'h/ 138 ( 6.417)
3'd/138 (6.217)
I"/ 138 (6.417)

Sources: World Bank, "Worldwide Governance Indicators 2016"; Asian Intelligence, No.
944, March 30, 2016, p. I; Transparency International "Comtption Perceptions Index
2016"; and Klaus Schwab (Ed.), 111e Global Compt•titil·em•s.~ Ht•port 2016-2017 (Geneva:
World Economic Forum, 2016), p. 319.

105. United Nations Ollicc on Urugs and Crime, United Nation~ Cml\'t'lltion Agai11st
Cormption (Vienna: UNODC, 2004), pp. 26-27.
106. CPJB, Ammal Report 20/6 (Singapore: CPIB. 2017), pp. 7,9.
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Corruption was widespread in Singapore during the British colonial
period because ofthe government's weak political will and reliance on the
ineffective Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB) of the Criminal Investigation
Department (CID) in the Singapore Police Force (SPF) to curb corruption.
The Prevention of Corruption Ordinance (POCO), which was enacted in
December 1937, made the ACB responsible for corruption control even
though the 1879 and 1886 Commissions of Inquiry had found that police
corruption was rampant in Singapore. The problem of corruption
deteriorated during the Japanese Occupation (February 1942 to August
1945) because the high inflation rate made it difficult for civil servants to
survive on their low salaries. Trading in the black market was a "way of
life" and nepotism and corruption were "perfectly acceptable" as
individuals depended on "connections, friends and relatives" to get jobs. 107
Conditions further worsened after World War II and bureaucratic
corruption increased because of the inadequate supervision of the poorly
paid civil servants. 108
The ACB was inetTective for three reasons. First, as a small police
unit with 17 personnel, the ACB was inadequate in minimizing corruption
in the Singapore Civil Service, including the SPF. Second, as the ACB was
a Type B ACA responsible for corruption control and 15 other noncorruption-related functions, this meant that combating corruption was
given lower priority and it had to compete with other branches of the
Criminal Investigation Department (CID) for limited manpower and
resources. Third, the ACB's Achilles' heel was that as part of the SPF it
could not curb police corruption because of the conflict of interest
involved. The ACB's weaknesses were exposed by the Opium Hijacking
scandal of October 1951 when it was discovered that three police
detectives were part of a gang of robbers who stole a shipment of 1,800
pounds of opium worth about US$133,330. Investigations revealed that
some senior police officers were also involved with the robbers and
importers of the opium. 109
The ACB's failure made the British colonial government realise that
it was unwise to rely on the ACB to curb corruption when there was
widespread police corruption in Singapore. The government rectified its
mistake by replacing the ACB with the CPIB in September 1952 as a Type

107. Lee Gek Boi, The Synonan Years: Singapore! 11111it!r Japancsc R11/e /942-1945
(Singapore: National Archives of Singapore and Epigr.tm. 2005). p. 142.
108. Quah ... Bureaucratic Corruption in the ASEAN Countrit..'S ... 161-162.
109. Jon S.T. Quah, Combating Corruption Singapore·S~\'Ie: Lessons for other Asian
Co11ntries (Balli more, MD: School of Law, Uni vcrsity of Maryland, 2007 ), pp. 14-16.
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A ACA outside the SPF'sjurisdiction. However, the CPIB was ineffective
during its first eight years because of its limited personnel and powers. The
CPIB had fewer personnel than the ACB as it began operations with R.
Middleton-Smith as its director and 12 otlicers, who were on short
secondment from the SPF. The CPIB investigation otlicers' "short
secondment and limited time and capacity to conduct thorough
investigations" and "the social stigma of investigating fellow police
otlicers" had hindered the CPIB's effectiveness. 110
The People's Action Party (PAP) won the May 1959 general election
in Singapore and formed the government with LEE Kuan Yew as prime
minister. In his memoirs, Lee revealed that he and his colleagues were
determined to keep Singapore free from corruption because they were
"sickened by the greed, corruption and decadence of many Asian leaders."
This was reflected in their wearing "white shirts and white slacks to
symbolize purity and honesty" in their personal behavior and public life
when they took the oath of otlice on June 5, 1959. 111
Learning from the mistakes of the British colonial government, the
PAP government retained the CPIB as an independent Type A ACA and
enhanced its effectiveness by enacting the Prevention of Corruption Act
(POCA) in June 1960 to strengthen its legal powers and increasing its
budget and personnel. The POCA empowers the CPIB director and
officers to arrest and search persons and to investigate their bank accounts,
income taxes, and other documents. More importantly, section 24 assists
the CPIB officers investigating corruption cases by requiring those
accused persons to account for their "pecuniary resources or property" that
are disproportionate to their known sources of income. 112
Unlike the British colonial government's weak political will in
combating corruption, the PAP leaders realized from the outset the critical
importance of political will by enhancing the CPIB's legal powers and
providing it with the required personnel and budget to perform its
functions effectively. The growth in the CPIB's budget and personnel
from 2008-20 15 is shown in Table 9 and reflected in the increase of its per
capita expenditure from US$2.32 in 2008 to US$4.87 in 2015. The CPIB's
staff-population ratio has also improved from I :56,163 to I :23,858 during
the same period.

110. CPIB, 111e Journey: 60 rears of Fighting Corn1ption in Singtlpore (Singapore: CPIB.
2012), p. 18.
Ill. Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to Firs/, the Singapore Storr: /965-2000
(Singapore: Times Media, 2000), pp. 182-183.
112. Quah, Curbing Cormplion ill Asian Countries, p. 220.
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Table 9: CPIB's Budget and Personnel, 2008-2015
CPIB
Budget (in millions)
Personnel
Per capita
expenditure
Staff-population mtio

zoos

2010

2012

2014

2015

US$11.2
86
US$2.32

US$14.7
90
US$2.90

US$20.3
138
US$3.82

US$29.3
205
US$5.36

US$26.8
232
US$4.87

1:56,163

I:56,408

1:38,496

1:26,682

1:23,858

So11rces: Compiled and calculated by the author from the CPIB's budget and personnel in
Republic of Singapore, Singapore llrul~et 2008-2016: Amrex to the E.rpentiifllre Estimate.~
(Singapore: Budget Division, Ministry of finance, 2008-2016), various pages.

In addition to its legal powers, adequate personnel and budget, the
CPIB is an effective Type A ACA for four reasons. First, even though the
CPIB comes under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister's Office, it has
operational autonomy because the prime minister and other political
leaders do not interfere in its daily operations and its director reports to the
secretary to the cabinet. After the establishment of the Elected Presidency
in 1991, the CPIB's director can obtain the Elected President's consent to
investigate allegations of conuption against ministers, members of
Parliament and senior civil servants if the prime minister withholds his
consent. 113 As "successive prime ministers and presidents have
persistently and unequivocally supported and defended" the CPIB's
impartiality, Gregory contends that "political self-denial by Singapore's
politicians maintains the agency's de facto independence, which is
essential for sustaining its reputation for impartiality, and thus its popular
lcgitimacy." 114
Second, the CPIB adopts a "total approach to enforcement" and deals
with both major and minor cases of public and private sector conuption,
regardless of the amount, rank or status of the persons being investigated.
The same processes and procedures apply to everyone being investigated,
including ministers and chief executive oflicers of major companies.
There is emphasis on both bribe-givers and bribe-takers as they are equally
culpable according to the POCA. 115 Section 37 of the POCA states that
Singapore citizens working for their government in embassies and other

113. Quah, Com hating Corntplimr Singapore-S~1·Jto. pp. 40-4 I.
114. Robert Gregory, "Political Independence, Operational Impartiality and the
Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Agencies," Asian J:illlc(lliotl and D<•n:/upme/11 Strtdie.~. 4 (I)
(20 15): 130-131.
115. Soh Kee llian, "Corruption Enforcement." (Paper presented at the Second Seminar of
the International Association of Anti-Corruption Associations, in Chongqing, China. May 1718, 2008), pp. 1-2. Soh was the CPIB director from 2005-2010.
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agencies abroad would be prosecuted for corrupt offenses committed in
other countries and would be dealt with as if such offenses had occurred
within Singapore. 1Jr, The CPIB also investigates anonymous corruption
complaints if there is sufficient information to initiate an investigation.
Third, the CPIB's effectiveness can be attributed to its efforts to
enhance the capabilities of its officers by sending them for training
programs on management and professional topics in Singapore and
abroad. It has organized four Anti-Corruption Expertise regional training
workshops in Singapore on investigation, computer forensics,
management of ACAs, and cross-border investigation and legal assistance
for ACA officers in many Asian countries from 2006-2015. In July 2004,
the CPIB formed a Computer Forensics Unit to enhance the investigative
and evidence-gathering skills of its officers by providing them with the
knowledge of forensic accounting to enable them to trace ill-gotten assets
and retrieve incriminating evidence from seized computers and mobile
telephones. The CPIB has also conducted joint operations with the
Commercial Affairs Department and the Immigration and Checkpoints
Authority to develop networks and partnerships with other public agencies
in Singapore. 117
The fourth and most important reason for the CPIB's success is its
impartial enforcement of the POCA. This means that anyone found guilty
of a corruption offense is punished regardless of his or her position, status,
or political affiliation. The CPIB has investigated five PAP leaders and
eight senior civil servants in Singapore without fear or favor from 19662014. For example, in November 1986, the Minister for National
Development, TEH Cheang Wan, was accused of accepting S$1 million
in bribes from two property developers. However, he committed suicide
one month later before he could be charged in court. The second example
involved Edwin Yeo, the CPIB's assistant director, who was charged on
July 24, 2013 with misappropriating US$1.41 million from 2008-2012. He
was found guilty of criminal breach oftrust and for forgery and sentenced
to 10 years imprisonment on February 20,2014. 1111

116. Quah, Curbi11~ Corruption ill Asian Countries. pp. 2211-221.
117. Soh, "Corruption Enforcement," pp. 3-4.
Ill!. Jon S.T. Quuh, "Singapore's Cormpt Practices lnvcstigution Bureau: Four Suggestions
for Enhancing its Effectiveness," Asian l:aucation and De1•elopme111 Studies. 4 (I) (20 I 5): 77,
l!0-81.
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B. Hong Kong's Effective Independent Commission Against
Corruption (ICAC)
In 2016, Hong Kong SAR was jointly ranked 15 111 with Belgium
among 176 countries with a CPI score of 77 and was the second least
corrupt city-state after Singapore. Like Singapore, Hong Kong's success
can be attributed to the ICAC's effectiveness as reflected in Table I0,
which confirms its low extent of perceived corruption, according to eight
indicators. Corruption was a serious problem in Hong Kong before the
establishment of the ICAC in February 1974. Bertrand de Spevillc, a
former ICAC commissioner, observed that "corruption was deeply rooted,
widespread, generally tolerated and, in some sectors, highly organized."
All government departments were infected with corruption, especially the
police, customs and excise service, immigration department, fire and
ambulance services, and the prison service. Corruption was also a problem
in the housing, public works, education and health departments. 119 Hong
Kong provided "a fertile soil for corruption to flourish" because the rapid
population increase during 1945-1974 severely strained the provision of
social services and food, housing, water, schools, health care and other
services were in short supply. Immigrants from mainland China were
encouraged to pay bribes to the police and other civil servants to avoid
being harassed by them. The government's monopoly and regulation of
various activities and the discretion given to those civil servants in charge
provided many opportunities for corruption. 120

Table 10: Hong Kong's Performance on Corruption Indicators, 2016
Indicator
Control of Corruption
Corruption Perceptions Index
PERC Corruption Survey
Diversion of Public Funds
Irregular Payments and Bribes
Organized Crime
Ethical Behavior of Firms
Public Trust in Politicians

Hone Kone's Performance
1.6 (91.8)
l5'h/l76 (77/100)
4'h/16 (3.40/10)
12'h/138 (5.917)
12'h/ 138 (6.317)
18'h/ 138 (6.017)
J7'h/ 138 ( 5.517)
21''/138 (4.617)

Srmras: World Bank, "Worldw1de Governance Indicators 20 16"; Transparency
International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2016"; Asian ltuelligence, No. 944, March
30, 2016, p. I; and Schwab (Ed.), The Global Competitin•ne.u Report '!016-'!017, p. 197.

119. Bertrand de Spevillc, IIOIIK Kong: Policy lnitiatil•es agaimt Corntption (Paris:
Development Center, OECD, 1997), p. II.
120. Ibid., pp. 13-14.
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As Hong Kong was also a British colony, an ACB was established as
a special unit within the CID of the Royal Hong Kong Police Force
(RHKPF) in 1948 to investigate and prosecute corruption cases. 121 The
police was the most corrupt government department 122 because the "daily
extensive contact with the public provided ample opportunity" for
policemen to be involved in corrupt activities. 123 Police corruption was
rampant during the early days of the RHKPF because the poorly paid
policemen supplemented their incomes by accepting bribes from the
owners of brothels and gambling dens, and the British colonial
government accorded low priority to crime control and tolerated the
alliance between the police and the triads. 124
As part of the ACB's review of the Prevention of Corruption
Ordinance (POCO), a study team visited Singapore in 1968 to examine
how its anti-corruption laws worked in practice. The study team was
impressed with the CPIB's independence and attributed Singapore's
success in combating corruption to the CPIB's independence from the
police. 125 The British colonial government in Hong Kong did not support
the creation of an independent ACA for three reasons: the adverse effects
on police morale; the difficulties in recruiting and training an independent
team of expert investigators; and the need for coordination with other
departments in the RHKPF related to anti-corruption investigations. 12c'
The RHKPF did not accept the study team's recommendation of
setting up an independent ACA outside its jurisdiction and suggested
instead the upgrading of the ACB into the Anti-Corruption Office (ACO)
with the enactment of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO) in
May 1971. 127 The escape of a corruption suspect, Chief Superintendent of
Police, Peter F. Godber, on June 8, 1973 to Britain angered the public in
Hong Kong and undermined the ACO's credibility. The government
appointed a Commission of Inquiry chaired by Sir Alastair Blair-Kerr to

121. Kuan Hsin-Chi, "Anti-Comtption legislation in Hong Kong- A History," in Lee (Ed.),
Cormption and its Control in /long Kong, p. 24.
122. leslie Palmier, The Cotllro/ of Bureaucratic Cormption: CtlSt' Studies in Asia (New
Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1985). p. 123.
123. de Speville, /long Kong. p. 14.
124. Allan Y. Jiao, The Police in lion~ Kong: :1 Comemporary View (Lanham. MD:
University Press of America. 2()()7 ), p. 194.
125. Wong, "The ICAC and its Anti-Comtption Measures," p. 47.
126. II.J. J.ethhridgc, /lard Graft in /long Kong: Scandal. Corn1ption. the /C4C (llong
Kong: Oxford University Press, I9M5 ), pp. 99-100.
127. Ibid .. p. 98.
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investigate the circumstances that enabled Godber to escape to Britain and
to evaluate the POBO's effectiveness. 128
The governor, Sir Murray MacLehose, accepted Sir Alastair's advice
of considering public opinion and decided for political and psychological
reasons to establish a new ACA that was independent of the RHKPF.
Thus, the revelation of Godber's corrupt activities and adverse publicity
arising from his escape to Britain was the catalyst that made the governor
accept the risk of removing the RHKPF's control over the investigation of
corruption. Maclehose's decision was path-breaking because his
predecessors and previous committees had deferred to the police mainly
because they feared a collapse of police morale if the control of corruption
was transferred to an independent ACA. 129
The lCAC was established on February 15, 1974 with the enactment
of the ICAC Ordinance to "root out corruption and to restore public
confidence in the Government." 130 MacLehose demonstrated his political
will in combating corruption by providing the ICAC in 1974 with 369
personnel and a budget ofHK$16.1 million (US$2.06 million).u 1 He was
the longest serving governor of Hong Kong from 1971 to 1982 and
continued to provide "unwavering budgetary support" to the ICAC until
his retirement. 132 His successors continued to provide the IC AC with
adequate budget and personnel as, 40 years later, its budget has increased
by 58 times to HK$937.12 million (US$120.14 million) and its number of
personnel grew by almost four times to I,358 in 2014. 133 Table II shows
that the ICAC's per capita expenditure has increased from US$13.40 in
2008 to US$17 .24 in 20 15 and its staff-population ratio has also improved
from I :5,780 to l :5,408 during the same period.

Table 11: ICAC's Budget and Personnel, 2008-2015
ICAC

2008

2010

2012

2014

2015

Budget (in
millions)

US$97.7

US$104.65

US$112.96

US$120.14

US$126.01

128. Quah. Curbing Cormption in Asian Countries. p. 252.
129. Ibid, pp. 252-253. Sec also Ray Yep, "llle Crusade against Corruption in I long Kong
in the 1970s: Governor MacLehose as a Zealous Rclonncr or Reluctant llero?" China
11!formation.17(2) (July 2013): 197-221.
130. Wong, "The ICAC and its Anti-Corruption Measures." p. 45.
131. Lethbridge, liard Grc~fi in /long Kong, pp. 107, 231.
132. Yep. "The Crusade against Corruption in llong Kong in the 1970s," 216.
133. "Head 72 Independent Commission Against Corruption," ICAC Budget 2014. llong
Kong, available at: www.budget.gov.hk/2014/eng!pdf/hcad072.pdf (accessed April 29. 2017)
and ICAC, Annual ReportlOJ.I (Hong Kong: ICAC. 2015), p. 25.
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1,263
US$13.40

1,321
US$14.89

1,282
US$15.78

1,358
US$16.59

1,351
US$17.24

I :5,780

1:5,317

1:5,581

1:5,333

1:5,408

Sources: Compiled and calculated by the author from the ICAC's budget and personnel
from its annual reports and budget from 2008-2015.

Why has Hong Kong succeeded in minimizing corruption after the
ICAC's formation in February 1974? A former ICAC commissioner,
Fanny Law, has identified these strengths ofHong Kong's "sound integrity
system": a strong political will to curb corruption; a common integrity
framework for civil servants, politicians, judicial officers, and staff of the
watchdog agencies; a vibrant civil society with independent media and
nongovernment organizations; and an independent ICAC with a
comprehensive anti-corruption program. 134
Bertrand de Speville, the ICAC commissioner from 1992-1997, has
attributed the ICAC's effectiveness to five factors. First, the most
important factor is the government's recognition that corruption is a
serious problem and its provision of adequate budget and personnel to the
ICAC to deal with it. Second, to gain public confidence, the ICAC must
be unimpeachable and its staff "must have unblemished integrity" and be
"dedicated and effective anti-graft fighters." Third, the ICAC has
formulated and implemented a carefully designed long-term threepronged strategy, which focuses on investigation, prevention, and
education. Fourth, the ICAC has succeeded in gaining public confidence
by ensuring that all corruption reports, no matter how small, are
investigated. Finally, the ICAC is effective because of"a combination of
factors that collectively produced an advantageous environment in which
to counter corruption.'' 135
In his evaluation of Hong Kong's integrity system, Cheung contends
that the ICAC's three-pronged strategy of investigation, prevention and
education has contributed to its success in combating corruption because
it has (I) inculcated fear among corrupt offenders by enforcing the anticorruption laws impartially; (2) reduced the opportunities for corruption
by streamlining procedures and management processes to prevent

134. Fanny Law, "The Hong Kong Integrity System," in Leo llubcns, Frank Ancchiarico
and Frederique Six (Eds.), l.ocal Integrity S.I'StettL~: World Cities Fighting Cor111ptio11 ami
Safeguarding Integrity (The Hague: Blu Legal Publishers, 200!!), pp. 98-99.
135. de Spcville, 1/ong Kong. pp. 53, 55-56.
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corruption; and (3) changed the population's attitudes toward corruption
through community education and publicity. 136
In short, the critical factor responsible for the ICAC's success is the
political will of Hong Kong's government to recognize corruption as a
problem and its commitment to solve it. De Speville has identified the
government's decision to tackle the problem of corruption as "the sine qua
non of effective action." The government must also be willing "to provide
adequate funding, realising that overcoming corruption will be
expensivc.'' 137

C. South Korea's "Toothless" ACAs
After his inauguration in February 1998, President KIM Dae-jung
launched a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy to ensure "clean and
upright public otlice, transparent and reliable government, and a just and
fair society" in South Korea. An important target was to improve South
Korea's ranking on the CPI from 43rt1 position in 1998 to 20th position in
2003. 138 Using this criterion, Kim's anti-corruption strategy failed
because South Korea was ranked 50th among 133 countries with a score of
4.3 in the 2003 CPJ. 139 Similarly, South Korea's weak performance on the
Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC) corruption survey was
reflected in the deterioration of its score of 4.00 in 1995 to 8.33 in 2000. 1 ~ 0

Table 12: South Korea's Performance on Corruption Indicators,
2016
Indicator
Control of Corruption
Corruption Perceptions Index
PERC Corruption Survey
Diversion of Public Funds
lrrcJ,!ular Payments and Bribes
Organized Crime
Ethical Behavior of Firms

South Korea's Performance
0.4 (66.8)
52 00/176 (531100)
g•h/16 (6.17/10)
69'h/138 (3.517)
52 00/138 (4.517)
691h/J38 (4.917)
981h/J38 (3.517)

136. Anthony B.l. Cheung. "Evaluation of lhe llong Kong Integrity System." in lluberts.
Anechiarico and Six ( Eds. ). l..oca/lmegrity .~rstems. p. I 06.
137. de Speville,l/ong Kong. p. 71.
138. Republic of Korea, Korea's Comprehensiw Anti-Comtption J>ro~rams (Seoul: Office
of the Prime Minister, 1999), p. 6.
139. From 1995-2011, lhe CPI score ranged from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean).
However, from 2012, the CPI score was changed to 0 (highly corrupt) lo I 00 (very clean).
140. Quah, C11rbing Corn~ption in Asian Cowllries, p. 338. The PERC corruption survey
score ranges from 0 (lt..'3st corrupt) to 10 (most corrupt).
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Public Trust in Politicians

96'h/ 138 (2.517)

Souret!.f: World Bank, "Worldwide Governance Indicators 2016"; Transparency
International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2016"; Asian Intelligence. No. 944, March
30,2016, p. I; and Schwab (Ed.), 111e Global Competith·eness Report20/6-2017, p. 225.

Table 12 confirms that corruption is still a serious problem in South
Korea according to the eight indicators in 2016, including the CPI and
PERC corruption survey in 2016. Its percentile rank for the World Bank's
Control of Corruption indicator is 66.8 and its ranking for the other five
indicators range from 52"d among 138 countries for Irregular Payments
and Bribes to 98 111 among 138 countries for Ethical Behavior of Finns in
2016.
South Korea's failure to curb corruption effectively can be attributed
to its government's weak political will, the low risk of detecting and
punishing corruption offenses, and the population's tolerance for corrupt
practices like gift-giving and paying chonji or bribe money. The South
Korean government's weak political will in curbing corruption is reflected
in the creation of the Korea Independent Commission Against Corruption
(KICAC) on January 25, 2002 and its replacement by the Anti-Corruption
and Civil Rights Commission (ACRC) on February 29, 2008.
Originally, the draft legislation initiated by the People's Solidarity
for Participatory Democracy and supported by other civil society
organizations proposed the establishment of the KICAC based on Hong
Kong's ICAC. The KICAC's formation met with stiff resistance in the
National Assembly and was also opposed by the Public Prosecutor's
Office (PPO) and the National Police Agency (NPA) because both
agencies wanted to perform the anti-corruption function themselves. 141
However, the lack of freedom of the PPO and NPA from the president's
influence has hindered "neutral law enforcement." 142 Consequently, the
Anti-Corruption Act's enactment on July 24, 2001 resulted in the
KICAC's formation as a "poor cousin" of the ICAC because it could not
investigate corruption cases. 143
The KICAC's inability to investigate corruption cases was its
Achilles' heel and meant that it was not a full-fledged Type A ACA
because it could not perform the primary function of investigating

141. Ibid., p. 330.
142. Jin-Wook Choi. "Anti-Corruption and Governance," in Ambar Widaningrum and Jin
Park (Eds.), G01·ernance am/ Reform in lndotlt'sia and Korea: A Comparatiw Perspectiw
(Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 2011 ), p. 43.
143. Jon S.T. Quah, "Defying Institutional Failure: learning from the Experiences of AntiCorruption Agencies in Four Asian Countries," Crime, Low and Soda/ Change. 53 (I) (20 I 0):
41-42.
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corruption cases and focused instead on the other functions of corruption
prevention and education. The KICAC was only responsible for dealing
with public sector corruption but not private sector corruption. Its anticorruption functions were further diluted by President LEE Myung-bak
when he merged the KICAC with the Ombudsman and Administrative
Appeals Commission in February 2008 to form the ACRC in order to
enhance their effectiveness. 144 However, the ACRC's creation, which
resulted from the merger of three agencies with "weak functional
relevancy and coherence," has blurred its anti-corruption role. 145
The ACRC has also inherited the KICAC's weaknesses because it
cannot investigate corruption cases and focuses only on public sector
corruption. Its stated objective was to improve its eflectiveness. However,
the unintended (or intended?) consequence of the KICAC's merger with
the Ombudsman and Administrative Appeals Commission is the dilution
of the emphasis given by the previous governments to combating
corruption by according lower priority to this objective. The ACRC's
establishment by President Lee reflected his weak political will in
combating corruption as Table 13 confirms the marginal increase in the
ACRC's per capita expenditure from US$0.97 to US$1.15 during 20082014 and its highly unfavorable staff-population ratios during the same
period.

Table 13: ACRC's Budget and Personnel, 2008-2014
ACRC

2008

2010

2012

2014

Budget (in millions)
Personnel
Per capita expenditure
Staff-population ratio

US$47.6
466
US$0.97
1:105.021

US$51.05
466
US$1.03
1:106,030

US$55.1
465
US$1.10
I: 107.527

US$58.3
465
US$1.15
I: I08,430

Source: Compiled and calculated by the author from the ACRC's budget and personnel.

Corruption flourishes in those countries where it is perceived as a
"low risk, high reward" activity because offenders arc unlikely to be
caught and punished. On the other hand, corruption is not a serious
problem where it is perceived as a "high risk. low reward" activity as those
involved in corrupt activities are likely to be caught and severely

144. Quah, Curbing Corruption in Asian Countries. p. 334.
145. Jin-Wook Choi. "Institutional Structures and Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption
Agencies: A Comparative Analysis of South Korea and Hong Kong," Asian Joumal cJ{ l'olitical
Science,/7(2)(2009):209.
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punished. 146 Corruption in South Korea is a "low risk, high reward"
activity because of the lenient punishment received by those found guilty
of corruption offenses. The ACRC's 2008 Corruption Perceptions Survey
found that "lenient punishment for corruption" was identified as an
important cause of corruption in South Korea by 24.1 percent of citizens,
21 percent of opinion leaders, 18 percent of business persons, 14.5 percent
of foreign residents, and 12.9 percent of public servants. 147

Table 14: Punishment of South Korean Public Officials
for Corruption Offenses, 1993-2004
TypeofCase

Guilty Verdict

Served actual
prison
sentence

Suspended
Sentences

Corruption case
41 (31.3%)
131
90 (68.7%)
Aggravated crimes
13 (21.0%)
49 (79.0%)
62
below
50 m. won
Aggravated crimes over
17 (48.6%)
18 (51.4%)
35
50 m. won
30 (31.0%)
Aggravated crimes total
97
67 (69.0%)
SourCt': Joongi Kim, "The Judiciary's Role in Good Governance in Korea," in M. Ramesh
and Scott Fritzen (Eds.), 1hm.iforming Asian Gtll'ernance: Rethinking Assumptions.
Challenging Practices (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 147.

According to the law, those persons found guilty of accepting bribes
exceeding 50 million won (US$50,000) would be imprisoned for longer
than I0 years, while those who had accepted bribes between 10 million
won and 50 million won (US$10,000 to US$50,000) would be jailed for
more than five years. However, in reality, the courts are unusually lenient
and do not impose the stricter sentences required by the law. Table 14
shows that for the 35 guilty public officials who accepted bribes exceeding
50 million won, only 17 (48.6 percent) were imprisoned and 18 (51.4
percent) received suspended sentences. Thus, more than halfofthe public
oflicials found guilty of grand corruption were not punished for their
misconduct.
The second reason why corruption is also a "low risk, high reward"
activity in South Korea is that those found guilty of corruption offenses
are not punished severely as they can be pardoned by the president. Former
President CHUN Doo-hwan was sentenced by the Seoul district court in

146. Quah, Curbing Corruption in Asian Cmmtrit·.~. p. 18.
147. ACRC. A11ti-Corruptio11 Atmual Report !OOH (Seoul: ACRC. 2009), p. 21.
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August 1996 to death for mutiny, treason and corruption. His successor,
former President ROH Tae-woo, was sentenced to 22.5 years'
imprisonment on similar charges. Both Chun and Roh were tined US$270
million and US$350 million, respectively. However, in December 1997,
President KIM Young-sam granted amnesty to both of them after serving
only 16 months in jail. 148
President LEE Myung-bak granted special pardons on January 29,
2013 to 55 persons who were imprisoned for bribery. Among those
pardoned were Lee's confidant and former minister, CHOI See-joong; his
friend and businessman, CHUN Shin-it; former parliamentary speaker,
PARK Hee-tae; and his former political affairs aide. This latest round was
the seventh time that Lee exercised his right to pardon guilty offenders
during his term of office.wl Consequently, he was criticized for "using
pardons to let offfriends and family at the end of one's presidency [which]
is more than shameless- it is a deliberate insult to the Korean people." 150
Culture contributes to corruption when traditional practices like giftgiving and family ties influence individuals to give or receive bribes, and
make them tolerate corrupt practices. The ACRC's 2008 Corruption
Perceptions Survey also found that the "social culture tolerant of
corruption" was identified as another important cause of corruption by
34.5 percent of foreign residents, 28.4 percent of opinion leaders, 25
percent of business persons, 23 percent of citizens and 19.6 percent of
public servants. 151 In South Korea, gitl-giving contributes to corruption
because an expensive gift is a bribe if it is given to an important individual
in order to receive a favor. Chonji is a way of life in South Korea as
mothers give chonji to teachers to ensure that their children do well at
school, young lecturers get jobs at colleges by paying chm~;;, and drivers
pay clwnji to avoid speeding tickets. Small businesses give cho11ii
frequently to those civil servants demanding money in exchange for every
stage of administrative action related to their trade. 152 Rich persons and
large companies also pay chmyi for the services and cooperation provided
by civil servants.
This "deeply entrenched custom" is practised by government
ministers and agencies that pay clwnji to journalists and editors for

148. Quah, Curbing Cormptimr in Asian Countri<•s, p. 324.
149. "South Korean leader pardons ex-aides." Stmits 7/mes, January 30, 2013.
150. C.ll. Aim, "President Lee's corrupt relatives and associates could be pardoned,"
Hanykyol'<'lt. January I 0, 2013.
151. ACRC, Anti-Corn1ptio11 Atmual Report 2008. p. 21.
152. B.S. Kim, "Corruption and Anti-Corruption Policies in Korea," Korea Joumal. 38 (I)
( 1998): 53.
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favorable coverage of their activities. The "chonji system makes the
various government offices hostage to the reporters who cover them"
because reporters write critical articles about government officials if they
"fail to hand over acceptable amounts." Press coverage of scandals
committed by public officials is "frequently linked to the failure of
officials to hand over enough clwnji to ensure a cover-up." Senior
executives of major corporations usually pay reporters chm~ji of one
million won for a favorable interview. 153
As South Korean business persons, politicians and senior government
officials frequently host dinner banquets, give expensive presents during
holidays, and make cash donations at weddings and funerals, these
practices reinforce the culture of collusion and pose serious corruption
risks because it is difficult to distinguish gifts from bribes. After many
years of debate, the National Assembly passed the Improper Solicitation
and Graft Act on March 3, 2015, which would imprison those journalists,
teachers and civil servants for up to three years for accepting single cash
donations or gifts worth more than one million won. 154
On May 9, 2016 the ACRC announced that the Improper Solicitation
and Graft Act would be implemented on September 28, 2016, This law
prohibits the acceptance of a gift worth 50,000 won (US$42.85) or
receiving more than 100,000 won (US$85.70) in cash for a wedding or
funeral; the acceptance of a gift worth more than one million won
(US$857) or accumulated gifts worth more than three million won
(US$2,571) a year; and public officials, journalists and teachers from
being treated to a meal by their job-related contacts if the meal costs more
than 30,000 won (US$25.71). 155 However, critics ofthis law contend that
the "tough limits on accepting meals and gifts" may have adverse effects
on the economy. 156 Nevertheless, the enactment of the Improper
Solicitation and Graft Act in March 20 15 and its implementation in
September 2016 would reduce the South Koreans' tolerance for corrupt
practices if the new gift-giving regulations are enforced impartially by the
public agencies.
Corruption can be minimized if South Koreans abhor corruption and
do not tolerate corrupt practices by anyone. This means that no one is
above the law and anyone found guilty of corruption offenses is punished

153. Boye Lafayette de Mente. Korean Etiquette and Ethics in Busines.~. 2nd edition
(Lincolnwood, IL: NTC Business Books, 1994), p. 30.
154. "South Korea passes anti-graft law," Straits 1'imt•s, March 5, 2015, p. A 13.
155. M.J. Ser, "Graft law targets monetary gifts," Korea JoongAng Dai(l'. May 10,2016.
156. "Backlash against S. Korea's strict anti-corruption law," Straits Timt•s. May 28,2016,
p. A26.
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according to the law, without special treatment or amnesty granted by the
president. If corrupt leaders and public officials are leniently punished for
committing corrupt acts and pardoned by the president, it would be
difficult to encourage South Koreans to avoid corruption if these corrupt
individuals are not punished severely tor their misconduct.
On August 25, 2017, LEE Jae-yong, Vice-Chairman of Samsung
Electronics, was sentenced to five years' jail for bribing then President
PARK Geun-hye to ensure Lee's control of the chaebol that owns his
company. 157 Lee's imprisonment indicates that Samsung is no longer
"untouchable" and that South Koreans would no longer provide business
leaders "political immunity in exchange for untrammeled economic
growth." 158 However, it remains to be seen whether President MOON Jaeinn, who was elected on May 9, 2017, has the political will to keep his
electoral promise to end the practice of pardoning those corporate tycoons
who arc found guilty of corruption offenses.
IV. COMBATING CORRUPTION WITH MANY
ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCIES

"Too many cooks spoil the broth. ..
English idiom 159
Among the 13 barriers to coordination identi tied by Peters,
"defending the organization's 'turf" or "the things that the organization
holds dear and may perceive as threatened by other organizations, such as
money, space, and time" 160 is perhaps the most important reason for the
competition and lack of coordination among the multiple ACAs in China,
India, and Philippines. This section explains why the reliance on multiple
ACAs in these three countries is ineffective in curbing corruption. Table
15 provides details ofthe ACAs in the three countries.

157. "Samsung heir Lee Jac-yong sentenced to 5 years' jail for bribery," Chmmel Nt'll~v.·l.via.
August 25.2017.
158. Choe Sang-Hun, Jcyup S. Kwaak and Paul Mozur, "Samsung verdict sends <t tough
new message to South Korea Inc.," New York 17mes, August 25.2017.
159. The meaning of this idiom is: "where there arc too many people trying to do something,
they make a mess of it." Sec "Idiom: Too many cooks spoil the broth" at:
https://www.usingenglish.com/rcfcrcncc/idioms/too+many+cooks+spoil+thc+broth.html
(accessed May 26, 2017).
160. B. Guy Peters, Pursuing Horizontal Managemelll: 71w /'o/itics of' Public Sector
Coordination (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2015), p. 32.
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Table 15: Reliance on Multiple ACAs in Three Asian Countries
Countn·
China

Anti-Corruotlon Al!eoc:les
Central Commission for Discipline lnspt:etion (lead ACA). Ministry of
Supervision. Supreme People's Procuratorate,
National Corruotion Prevention Bureau
India
Central Bureau of Investigation (lead AC A). Centml Vigilance
Commission. Anti-Corruption Bureall~ and State Vigilance Commissions in 28
States
Philippines Office of the Ombudsman (lead ACA). Sancliganbayan (Special Anti-Gran
Coun), Presidential Commission on Good Government, Inter-Agency AntiCorruption Coordinating Council, Ollice of the Deputy Secretary for Legal
Affairs
Source: Compiled by the author.

A. China's Flawed ACAs
Table 16 shows that China has a high level of perceived extent of
corruption according to eight corruption indicators in 2016. While China's
score on the PERC survey has worsened from 7.3 in 1995 to 7.5 in 2016,
its CPI score has increased from 21.6 to 40 during the same period. 161
However, corruption remains an intractable and "maddingly resilient"
problem in China today in spite of its reliance on multiple ACAs and anticorruption campaigns. 162

Table 16: China's Performance on Corruption Indicators, 2016
Indicator
Control ofCorruotion
Corruption Perceptions Index
PERC Corruption Survey
Diversion of Public Funds
Irregular Payments and Bribes
Organized Crime
Ethical Behavior of Firms
Public Trust in Politicians

China's Performance
-0.3 (49.0)
79'"1176 (40/100)
11'"116 (7.5/1 0)
44'"1138 (4.117)
54'"1138 (4.317)
78'"1138 (4.717)
52'1d/ 138 (4.117)
30' 11/138 (4.2/7)

Source.~:

World Bank, "Worldwide Governance Indicators 2016": Tmnsparency
International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2016": Asian lntelli~e/lce. No. 944, March
30,2016, p. I; and Schwab (Ed.), 71w Global Competitil•ent•.u Rt•port20/6-2017, p. 147.

161. Jon S.T. Quah, "Singapore's Success in Combating Corruption: Four lessons for
China," American Joumal of Chinese Smclit•s. 23 (2) (2016): 196.
I 62. Robert lawrence Kuhn, /loll' China:~ Lemler.~ Think: The lnsid(· Story of Chinas Past,
Current unci 1-"ufllre Leaders. Revised edition (Singapore: John Wiley & Sons Asia. 2011 ), p.
I NO.
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1. Reliance 011 Multiple ACAs
As the four ACAs in China employ a sectoral approach in
investigating corruption, the Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection (CCDI), which is the lead ACA, and the Discipline Inspection
Commissions (DICs) are responsible for disciplining those members of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) accused of corruption offenses. Those
found guilty of disciplinary offenses, including corruption, are punished
according to the severity of their offenses. 163 However, the CCDI was
criticized for protecting party cadres who were under investigation by
shielding them in "a safe nest" and exempting them from criminal
punishment. IM Among the 115, I 43 CCP members disciplined during
1992-2006, 44,836 (38.9 percent) were warned, and 32,289 (28 percent)
of them were given a serious warning. Thus, two-thirds of those party
members who were disciplined "got away with only a mild to serious
warning that appeared to have no real punitive conscqucnccs." 165
The CCP has treated its corrupt members leniently because of the
political tradition of not imposing them with the legal penalty to avoid
embarrassing the CCP and government and prevent the erosion of ofiicial
authority. Thus, instead of punishing high-ranking officials, which is
shameful and threatens the authority of the CCP and government, the
preferred option is to rely on "internal resolution." Not surprisingly.
corrupt party officials believe that they would unlikely be caught and
punished. 166
As not all party officials who arc suspected of corruption and
investigated in China are convicted, there are three reasons why some
corrupt officials are punished less severely. First, those corrupt officials
who are cooperative, make voluntary confessions, provide information on
other corrupt officials, and return illegal income to the government, arc
punished less severely. Second, some corrupt officials receive less harsh
punishment depending on the definition of the amount of money

163. These punishments include a waming, serious waming, demotion from duty, expulsion
from the CCP with il two-year prob01tion period, or expulsion from the CCP 01nd transfer to the
judicial system for those accused of accepting bribes exceeding 5,000 yuan. Sec Flom Sapio,
Implementing A11ti-Cormptio11 i11 the I'RC: l'aflems of Se/ectil'it)' (Lund: Center for East and
Southeast Asi01n Studies, Lund University. Working Paper No. 10. 2005), pp. 8 and 10.
164. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
165. Minx in Pci, "Fighting Corruption: A Difficult Challenge for Chinese Leaders," in
Cheng Li (Ed.), Chi11a 's Cha11~inR Politicall.tmc/.w·ape: ProspectsfiJI' Democraq• (Washinr,ton.
IJC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), pp. 230-232.
I 66. Lening Zhang, "White-Collar Crime: Bribery and Com1ption in China." in Jianhong
l.iu, Lcning Zhang and Steven F. Messner (Ed~.), Crime a11<l !>"ucial Control in China ( Wcstpon,
CT: Greenwood Press. 200 I), pp. 28 and 33.
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embezzled or bribes received. Third, when there are too many corrupt
officials, only seriously corrupt officials are punished but the less corrupt
officials are exempted from punishment in order to avoid paralyzing the
operations of the city or local government. Indeed, "when the number of
corrupt agents becomes too high, curbing corruption becomes too difficult,
if not impossible." 1c'7 The inconsistencies in investigating and punishing
corrupt officials at both the central and local levels in China have
undermined the credibility of the disciplinary agencies and encouraged the
belief among the officials that they would unlikely be punished for
corruption offenses. 1c'8
The Ministry of Supervision (MOS) was dissolved in 1959 but was
restored by the Standing Committee of the 6'h National People's Congress
in December 1986 to curb corruption in the civil service. 16'' It is
responsible for checking "all contracts signed with foreign interests for
any indications of 'corruption' -from failure to provide for compensation
within legal limits to undercover arrangements that amount to bribery." 170
The MOS also receives and investigates complaints about civil servants
and personnel of state administrative departments violating administrative
procedures. The CCDI and MOS have their counterparts at the provincial,
municipal and county levels. As most civil servants are also CCP
members, the MOS and CCDI merged in January 1993 after working
together for six years. Nevertheless, both ACAs have retained their
separate organizational identities, with the MOS being responsible for the
control of administrative punishment in State Council organs and the
CCDI focusing instead on the punishment of the CCP members. 171
The Supreme People's Procuratorate (SPP) was re-established in
1978 to combat judicial corruption. Anti-corruption efforts in the SPP
were institutionalized after the Tiananmen anti-corruption and democracy
movement in 1989 with the establishment of the Procuratorial Division of
Graft and Bribery, the Bureau for Embezzlement and Bribery of the
People's Procuratorate, and the General Bureau of Anti-Corruption. 172 In
December 1995, the SPP further strengthened its capacity by creating an

167. Yongshun Cai, ,\'tate and Agents in China: Disciplining Gowmmelll Qflicials
(Sianford, CA: Stanford University l'rcss, 2015), pp. 130-131.
168. Ibid .• p. 133.
169. Stephen K. Ma, "The IJual Nature of Anti-Corruption Agcnc1es 111 China," Cnme. I.all'
and Social Change. 49 (2) (March 2008): 154.
170. Boyc Lufuyctlc De 1\.lcntc, 71w Chill<'·"' Way ill /Jusill<'ss: 17w Sccr<•ls ilj Surrl'<~fil/
Business Dealings in China (Tokyo: Tuttle l'ublishing, 2013), p. 99.
171. David Shambaugh, China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Washinglon,
IJC: Woodrow Wilson Ccnler Press, 2001!), pp. 132-133.
172. Ma, "The Dual Nalure of Anti-Comtption Agencies in China," 154.
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Anti-Corruption and Anti-Bribery General Office and similar offices at the
provincial level in 28 provincial procuratorates and at the municipal level
in nearly 300 municipal procuratorates. m
Unlike the CCDI, MOS and SPP, which focus on the investigation
and prosecution of corruption ofTenses among public oflicials, the
National Corruption Prevention Bureau (NCPB) was formed on
September 13, 2007 as China's fourth ACA to implement preventive
measures, monitor the transfer of assets across the organizations, facilitate
and promote information sharing between agencies, and police corrupt
practices among private enterprises, social organizations, and
nongovernmental organizations. This means that the NCPB focuses on
corruption prevention and private sector corruption, which arc not dealt
with by the CCDI, SPP and MOS. The NCPB is located within the MOS
and consists of 30 personnel drawn from the MOJ, the Supreme People's
Court and the SPP. 174
The CCDI, MOS and SPP arc ineffective ACAs because the "limited
coordination between the three agencies, a lack of timely, actionable
information, and narrow oversight capabilities all hinder anti-corruption
work." 175 However, the NCPB cannot enhance coordination and facilitate
cooperation among the ACAs in China because apart from its limited
independence and minimal enforcement capabilities, its creation has
increased complexity instead of improving coordination. The NCPB is in
"a highly untenable position" because it lacks the power to enforce its
mandate of coordinating the work of the ACAs.m' The NCPB 's creation
is "symbolic" as it cannot investigate individual cases of corruption. 177
2. Reliance on Anti-Cormption Campaigns

Apart from relying on the four ACAs to implement the anticorruption laws and regulations, the CCP also employs anti-corruption
campaigns to enhance their enforcement. In China, a mass campaign is "a
series of organized, planned actions for a particular purpose, usually

173. Jon S.T. Quah, Hunting the Corntpt "Tigers" and "Flies" in China: An Emluation of
Xi Jinping 's Ami-Cormption Campaign (NtJ\'ember 2012 to March 20/5) (Balli more. MD:
Carey School of Law. University of Maryland. 20 15). p. 27.
174. Jefficy Becker. "Tackling Com1ption at its Source: The National Com~ption Prevention
Bureau," Joumal of Chinese l'o/itical Science, 13 (3) (2008): 291.
175. Ibid., 287.
176. Ibid., 297-299.
177. Chen Gang and Zhu Jinjing, "China's Recent Clampdown on lligh-Stakcs Com1ption."
EA/ /Jackgrowul /Jrief. No. 490 (Singapore: East Asian Institute, National University of
Singapore, November 19, 2009), p. 13.
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involving the mobilization of a large number of people to engage in highly
visible, intensive, and concentrated activities." t78 The anti-corruption
campaigns in China during the 1980s and 1990s were anti-corruption
struggles (fan .fubai douzheng) characterized by enhanced publicity to
encourage the public to report corruption and corrupt officials to confess
their misconduct, and the demand by the political leaders to increase the
enforcement of the anti-corruption measures. t79
In November 2012, President XI Jinping launched the most intensive
anti-corruption campaign to eliminate the "tigers and flies" or those senior
and junior officials who had become rich through bribery and patronage.
This campaign focuses on these aspects: (I) grassroots level where
whistle-blowers and netizens use social media to expose low-ranking
corrupt officials: (2) corrupt officials below the county and department
levels; (3) private sector corruption; and (4) corruption as a weapon in
factional infighting among the CCP leaders.tso More importantly, Xi's
campaign curbs the Chinese officials' extravagance on the three public
expenses on vehicles, banquets, and overseas trips or sangong xial?fei,
which has generated a great deal of public criticism. The "Eight
Directives" (baxiang guiding) to streamline the bureaucracy and curb
waste and extravagance were approved by the CCP Politburo on
December 4, 20 12 and implemented in the provinces and municipalities
from January 2013.tst
Xi's anti-corruption campaign also relies on inspection teams
(xunshizu) which are sent across China to investigate corruption in
corruption-prone provinces, ministries, state corporations and public
agencies. The CCDI sent 20 inspection teams across the country in 2013,
followed by another 26 inspection teams in 2014.t 82 In addition, the CCDI
has stationed 53 DICs in 48 leadership bodies among the ministries and
agencies of the State Council, the Supreme People's Court, the SPP, and

17X. Alan P.L. Liu. "Mass Campaigns and Political Development in China," Currml ScL"ne.
11 (8) (August 1973 ): I.
179. Melanic Manion, Cormption 1~1· Design: Building Clean Gm•emment in Mainland
China and Hong Kong (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), p. I 61.
IHO. Andrew Wcdeman, "Xi Jinping's Tiger llunt and the Politics of Corruption" China
Research, 13 (2) (October 15, 2014): 204.
181. Shi Jiangtao, "Xi Jinping's guiddincs to cut back extravagance go into effect," South
China Morning l'o.vt. January 4, 2013.
182. Chen Gang, ''The 'Tigers' in Xi Jinping's Anti-Corruption Campaign," EAI
Backwormd /Jriel No. 933 (Singapore: East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore,
June 30, 2014), p. 9 and Chen Gang, "Wang Qishan and China's Central Commission for
Discipline Inspection," £A1 Jlackground /Jrief. No. 1012 (Singapore: East Asian Institute,
National University of Singapore, April 2. 2015). pp. 16-17.
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major state-owned enterprises. IMJ The campaign has resulted in the
investigation of 74 civilian "tigers" or officials of vice-ministerial rank or
above and 30 military "tigers" in the People's Liberation Army (PLA)
from November 2012 to May 2015. 184 Furthermore, over 180,000 CCP
members and government ofticials, 74 provincial level ofticials, 4,024
PLA ofticers (including 82 generals), and 68 ministerial and viceministerial ofticials were investigated and punished during 2013-2014. 185
However, in spite of the large numbers of party members and
government otlicials being investigated and punished for corruption
offenses, Xi's anti-corruption campaign is ineffective for three reasons.
First, the Achilles' heel of Xi's campaign is that it has treated the
symptoms of corruption instead of addressing its five causes in China. The
campaign has focused only on discouraging the cultural practices of
guanxi (connections) and gift-giving by curbing official extravagance on
the three public expenses of cars, banquets, and overseas trips. In addition
to the "Eight Directives", the State Council issued on November 25,2013
a regulation that banned all government agencies from using public funds
to organize galas. This was followed by another regulation in December
2013 that removed shark's fin soup, bird's nest soup and wild animal
products from the menu and prohibited the provision of free cigarettes and
expensive liquor at official dinners. 1Mb Xi himself set an example by having
a simple dinner of "four dishes and a soup" during his official visit to
Fuping county in Hebei Province in late December 2012. 187 The State
Council circulated on December 18, 2013 guidelines for "funeral and
internment reform" to ensure that CCP members and officials set an
example for others by having "simple, civilized funerals without
monumental gravestones, fireworks and the practice of collecting gifts
(bribes)." 188
This means that the other four causes of low salaries of officials, red
tape, low probability of detection and punishment of corruption offenders,
and discretion of local officials without accountability, are not addressed

183. Cheng Li. Chinese Polilics in lhe Xi Jinpin~ l:'ra: Rea.,·sessin~ Co/lecliW! Leadership
(Washington. DC: Brookings Institution Press. 2016). p. 41!.
184. Quah, Hunting 1he Corntpl "Tiger.~" and "Hie.~ .. in China. pp. 41-54.
185. David Shambaugh, China's Fwure (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. 2016), p. 119.
186. J.T. Quigley, "No more Shark's Fin Soup and Bird's Nest Soup at CCP Banquets," The
l>iplomal. December 9, 2013.
I 1!7. Brian Spegclc, "Xi cats plainly amid focus on official waistlines," Wall S1ree1 Joumal.
December 31,2012.
188. Christina Larson, "China's anti-gran campaign bans luxury funerals." Bloomberg
Business. December 20, 2013.
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by the CCP. 189 Corruption in China cannot be minimized unless the CCP
also initiates appropriate measures to deal with these causes. This
limitation of Xi's campaign was indicated by WANG Qishan, the CCDI's
Secretary, in October 2014 when he admitted that "it's necessary to
address the symptoms of corruption before treating its root causes. " 1911
Shambaugh also observes that Xi's campaign targets "the behavioral
manifestations of corruption (bribery, private villas, lavish lifestyles,
luxury goods, mistresses)" but "not the systemic sources of corruption
(lack of transparency, lack of autonomous media, lack of autonomous
judiciary, rent-seeking, slack auditing and tax systems, and lack of
political competition)." 1'JI In short, after almost five years, Xi's campaign
is still focusing on the symptoms of corruption without treating the other
four causes.
Second, Xi's anti-corruption campaign is ineffective because of the
selective enforcement of the anti-corruption laws by the four ACAs.
Unlike Singapore's CPIB, which has enforced the POCA impartially, the
CCP enforces the anti-corruption laws selectively by protecting its corrupt
members by handing them over to the CCDI to discipline them internally
within the Party instead of transferring them to the SPP for criminal
investigation and prosecution. However, not all the corrupt officials are
protected by the CCP, especially those who are viewed to be political
opponents by the CCP leaders. Xi's campaign is described as "a selective
purge" because "many members of JIANG Zemin's factional network, and
a rising number of HU Jintao's, have been brought down-yet none of
Xi's own princeling associates have been touched." 192 Thus, the acid test
of the impartiality of Xi's anti-corruption campaign would be the
investigation and prosecution of all "tigers and flies," regardless of their
political affiliation or membership of factions within the CCP.
The third reason for the ineffectiveness of Xi's campaign is the CCP
leaders' reliance on corruption as a weapon against their political
opponents, as reflected in the persecution of CHEN Xitong, CHEN
Liangyu, BO Xilai and ZHOU Yongkang from 1995 to 2014. These four
party leaders were prosecuted not only for their corruption offenses but,
more importantly, because they posed a threat to the consolidation of
power of Presidents JIANG Zemin, HU Jintao and XI Jinping,
189. For an analysis of these causes, sec Jon s:r. Quah, Minimizing Corruption in China: Is
this all Impossible Dream? (Baltimore, MD: Carey School of Law, University of Law,
University of Maryland, 2013 ), pp. 41-58.
190. Sun Xiaobo, "Institutionalizing anti-corntption a vital task," Global Times, October 19,
2014.
191. Shambaugh, China's f'uture, p. 120.
192. Ibid., pp. I 19-120.
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respectively. China is not unique in using the CCDI as an attack dog
against the CCP leaders' political foes because "the tendency to use
corruption to settle political scores is widespread" in Cambodia,
Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam too. 193
Thus, Xi's anti-corruption campaign is ineiTective because it fails to
address the causes of corruption, the eCDI enforces the anti-corruption
laws selectively by protecting corrupt ecp members from criminal
investigation and prosecution, and the CCP leaders usc the CCDI as an
attack dog against their political opponents. Even if President Xi continues
his anti-corruption campaign until the end of his ten-year term of office in
November 2022, the corrupt "tigers" and "flies" would resume business
as usual the next day as though the campaign had not occurred at all
because the incentives and opportunities for corruption persist in China
and would prove to be irresistible to them once again. In short, "without
tackling the underlying causes of corruption, no anti-corruption campaign,
no matter how long it lasts or how intensive it is, can minimize the
systemic corruption in China." 194

B. India's Ineffective ACAs
Unlike China, India is a democracy and was a former British colony.
However, unlike Hong Kong and Singapore, India has not benefitted from
the legacy of British colonial rule and has failed to curb corruption because
of the Jack of political will of its governments and their continued reliance
on ineffective and poorly resourced Type B ACAs. The Central Bureau of
Investigation (CBI) and the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) arc the
most important ACAs in India, with the CBI as the lead ACA. As India is
a sub-continent and the seventh largest country in the world with a land
area of 3,287,263 sq. km, 1<) 5 the CBI and eve rely on a vast network in
the 28 states with their own anti-corruption bureaus (ACBs) and state
vigilance commissions (SVCs) to deal, respectively, with anti-corruption
and vigilance work, but the ACBs derive their powers of investigation
from the Police Act because they are regular police units. The CBI has 16
zones and 60 branches, with each state having at least a branch or unit at
the state capital or a major city. The SVes arc patterned after the eve and

193.
(Berlin:
194.
195.

Dini Djalal, "Southeast Asia," in Robin llodcss (Ed.). Global Cormpticm Report !00/
Transparency International. 2001 ), pp. 32-33.
Quah. H11111ing the Corntpt .. Tigers·· m1d .. F/i<•s ··in China. p. 96.
Economist, Pocket World in Figures !0/6 Edition, pp. 14, 156.
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are assisted by the ACBs in conducting investigations of corruption by
public servants.•%
The high level of perceived extent of corruption in India is reflected
in its weak perfonnance on the eight indicators shown in Table 17. India's
low percentile rank of 4 7.1 in 20 I 6 for the control of corruption is
confirmed by its 79' 11 ranking among 176 countries on the CPI in 20 16, and
its last position on the 2016 PERC corruption survey. Similarly, the other
five indicators in The Global Competitiveness Report 2016-201 7 show
that there arc high levels of diversion of public funds, irregular payments
and bribes, and organized crime; and low levels of ethical behavior of
finns, and public trust in politicians.

Table 17: India's Performance on Corruption Indicators, 2016
Indicator
Control of Corruption
Corruption Perceptions Index
PERC Corruption Survey
Diversion of Public Funds
Irregular Payments and Bribes
Organized Crime
Ethical Behavior of Firms
Public Trust in Politicians

India's Performance
-0.3 (47.1)
791h/J76 (40/100)
16111/16 (8.13/10)
34111/138 (4.517)
49111/138 (4.517)
97111/138 (4.317)
371h/J38 (4.517)
31"1138 (4.217)

Sources: World Bank. "Worldwide Governance Indicators 2016"; Transparency
International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2016": Asia11 lmelligellce, No. 944, March
30,2016, p. I; and Schwab (Ed.), The Global Competitiwress Report 20/6-20/7, p. 203.

Corruption was made an offense in the Indian Penal Code in 1860 but
India's battle against corruption only began with the creation of the Delhi
Special Police Establishment (DSPE) in 1941 to "investigate cases of
bribery and corruption in transactions" involving the War and Supply
Departments because the tremendous increase in expenditure during the
early stages of the Second World War provided many opportunities for
corruption. 1'' 7 The CBI was established by the Government oflndia (GOI)
in April 1963 by incorporating the DSPE as the Investigation and AntiCorruption Division with five other divisions. The CBI perfonns these
functions: (I) combating public sector corruption and curbing economic
and violent crimes through investigation and prosecution; (2) ensuring
"effective systems and procedures for successful investigation and
prosecution of cases in various law courts"; (3) fighting cyber and high

196. Qua h. Curbillf.! Corruptioll ill Asia11 Coumries. p. 97.
197. Ibid., pp. 92-93.

COMBATING ASIAN CORRUPTION

51

technology crime: (4) supporting state police organizations and law
enforcement agencies regarding enquiries and investigation of cases: and
(5) playing the lead role in combating national and transnational organized
crime. 198
The CBI is a Type B ACA because it performs both anti-corruption
and non-corruption-related functions as reflected in three of its divisions.
The Anti-Corruption Division is responsible for investigating corruption
and fraud cases committed by public servants working tor the central
government. The Economic Crimes Division investigates bank and
financial frauds, import export and foreign exchange violations, largescale smuggling of narcotics, antiques, cultural property, and smuggling
of other contraband items. The Special Crimes Division deals with cases
of terrorism, bomb blasts, sensational homicides, kidnapping for ransom
and organized crime. 199
The eve was formed in February 1964 on the recommendation of
the Santhanam Committee to perform these tour functions: (I )
investigating improper transactions by public servants: (2) examining
complaints of corruption, misconduct, lack of integrity or other
malpractices committed by public servants; (3) supervising the vigilance
and anti-corruption work of ministries, departments, and public enterprises
by requesting and checking their reports on these activities; and ( 4)
requesting the CBI to investigate a case or entrust the complaint,
information or case for inquiry to the CBI, or to the ministry, department,
or public enterprise concerned. 200
India's high level of perceived corruption is also a reflection of the
ineffectiveness of the CBI and CVC, which are afllicted with several
weaknesses. The CBI's Achilles' heel is that it is a police agency because
it derives its investigating powers from the DSPE Act of 1946. This means
that, unlike Singapore's CPIB or Hong Kong's ICAC, the Government of
India (GOI) has continued to employ the traditional British colonial
government's method of relying on the police to curb corruption in India
since 1963 even though this method is ineffective. As shown in Section
III, the experiences of the CPIB and ICAC have exposed the folly of
relying on the police to curb corruption when they are corrupt because the
"golden rule" is that "the police cannot and should not be responsible for

198. CBI, Anmwl Report :!014 (New Delhi: CRI, 2015), p. iii.
199. Ibid., p. 4.
200. C.V. Narasimhan. "J>rcvention of Corruption: Towards Effective Enforcement." inS.
Guhan and Samuel Paul ( Eds. ), Cormption in India: Agetula for Action (New Delhi: Vision
Books, 1997), pp. 264-265.
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investigating their own deviance and crimes." 201 Unlike Singapore and
Hong Kong, which have rejected the British colonial government's
method of relying on the police to curb corruption after 15 years and 26
years, respectively, the Got has not learnt this important lesson after 54
years because it still relies on the CBI, which is a police agency, to fight
corruption in the midst of rampant police corruption in India. This
weakness is not surprising because "the greatest failing of India's domestic
political system is its inability or unwillingness to curb widespread
corruption. " 202
The CBI's second weakness is that it is a Type B ACA that is
responsible for the investigation and prosecution of corruption cases as
well as other economic crimes and special crimes like terrorism and
organized crime. After the Mumbai terrorist attacks in November 2008
and the current international concern with combating terrorism, it will be
difficult for the CBI to focus exclusively on its anti-corruption functions
because of the competing demands on its limited resources. This means
that combating corruption is accorded much lower priority than fighting
terrorism by the CBI. It should be noted that the CBI is not responsible for
the other important functions of education, prevention and coordination of
anti-corruption activities, which are neglected in India.
Third, the CBI is both under-staffed and poorly funded to perform its
various functions effectively. Table 18 shows that while the CBI's
establishment has grown from 5,886 in 2003 to 7,274 in 2015, its actual
strength varies from 4,623 in 2007 to 5,796 in 2013. This means that the
number of vacancies ranges from 719 ( 12.1 percent) in 2009 to 1,693 (23.3
percent) in 2015. The CBI's perennial inability to fill its many vacant
positions during 2002-2015 reflects its serious staff shortage. B.R. Lall, a
former CBI joint director, described the CBI as "a very small organization
as compared to the quantum of crimes" committed in India and
recommended the expansion of its personnel by 20 percent annually for
the next decade. 203 The CBI's staff shortage is also not surprising and
reflects the Indian state's inadequate capacity to perform its essential
functions because of"cndcmic shortfalls in human rcsourccs." 204

20 I. Maurice Punch, l'o/ice Corruption. Oel'iance. Accountuhili~r ami RefiJrm in Policing
(London: Routledge, 2009), p. 245.
202. Michael R. Auslin, The Em/ of the Asian Cen/1/ry: War, Stug11atio11. and the Risks to
rile World's mostl~I'IWtllic Regio11 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017), p. 118.
203. B.R. Lall, Who 0\\'IIS the C/11? 11w Naked 1i11tl! (New Delhi: Manas Publications,
2007), pp. 230-231.
204. Milan Vaishnav, 1Vhe11 Crime Pays: Money um/ Muscle ill f11cliull Politics (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 2017), p. 43.
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Table 18: Growth of CBI's Personnel, 2002-2015
Year

Establishment
(100%)
5,920
5,886
5.891
5.891
5,959
5.959
5.960
5,961
6,526
6,590
6,586
6,674
6,676
7.274

Adual Strength

Vacant Positions

1,012 (17.1%)
4,908 (82.9%)
2002
4.938 (83.9%)
948 ( 16.1%)
2003
1,080 ( 18.3%)
4.811 (81.7%)
2004
4.711 (80.(1%)
1.180 (20.0%)
2005
1.307 (21.9%)
4.652 (78.1 %)
21106
4,623 (77.6%)
1,336 (22.4%)
2007
4,874 (81.8%)
1,086 ( 18.2%)
2008
719 (12.1%)
5.242 (87.9%)
2009
1,379 (21.1%)
20 [()
5.147 (78.9%)
924 (14.0%)
5,666 (86.0%)
2011
831 (12.6%)
2012
5.755 (87.4%)
5.796 (86.8%)
878 ( 13.2%)
2013
5,676 (85.0%)
1,000 ( 15.0%)
2014
2015
5.581 (76.7%)
1.693 (23.3%)
Sources: CBI. Annual Reports 1004-10/5 (New Delhi: CBI. 2005-2016), various pages
and CVC, Annual Report10/5 (New Delhi: CVC. 2016). p. N2.

Table 19: CBI's Budget and Personnel, 2005-2014
2005
CBI
2008
2014
Budget (in millions)
US$30.3
US$52.1
US$65.5
4,711
5,676
Personnel
4.874
Per capita expenditure
US$0.03
US$0.04
US$0.05
Staff-population ratio
1:234,217
I :243,373
1:228.206
Sources: Compiled by the author from the CBJ's budget and personnel provided in its
annual reports from2005-2014.
Arising from the CBI's chronic staff shortage, it is not surprising that
its staff-population ratio is unfavorable and ranges from I :234,217 in 2005
to 1:228.206 in 2014. Table 19 indicates that even though the CBI's budget
has grown from US$30.3 million in 2005 to US$65.5 million in 2014, its
per capita expenditure has increased only marginally from US$0.03 to
US$0.05 during the same period. The CBJ's inadequate personnel and
budget reflect the GOI's weak political will in curbing corruption in India.
The CBI's fourth limitation is that it cannot investigate corruption
cases at the state level because the Constitution of India states that law and
order come under the jurisdiction of the states. Section 5 of the DSPE Act
of 1946 gives the CBI investigating powers and indicates that the central
government can empower it to investigate the notified offenses in any state
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with the consent of the government of that state. 205 The CBI did not
encounter any problem with that arrangement when the Congress Party
was in power in the states and center during the post-independent period.
However, with the Congress Party's decline in power, some state
governments had withdrawn the consent given by their predecessors
"whenever they felt that an investigation taken up by the CBI was
politically embarrassing or uncomfortable for them." C.V. Narasimhan, a
former CBI director, contends that the CBI's "unstable" status as an
investigating agency within a state depends on the latter's mercy and is "a
serious handicap" in developing a national network of anti-corruption
investigating units. 21 1<'
The CBI's fifth weakness is its lack of independence because it is "a
nightmare" as an organization that serves "multiple masters" including the
Ministry of Home Affairs for the appointment of the CBI director; the
Ministry of Personnel, Training and Public Grievances for its budget; the
Union Public Service Commission for the appointment of CBI senior
officers above the rank of Superintendent of Police; the CVC, which
supervises its investigation of corruption cases; and the Ministry of Law
and Justice, which pays the salaries of its prosecutors. 207 The CBI was
perceived by the public as "a pliable tool of the ruling [Congress] party,
and its investigations tend to become cover-up operations for the misdeeds
of ministers. "208 Madhav Godbole, a former senior civil servant in India,
criticized the CBI for being used by the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
as "an instrument of persecution" and for its "disgraceful" record of
investigating corruption cases "involving the high, the mighty and the
powcrful."209 More recently, the former Central Vigilance Commissioner
N. Vittal has criticized the CBI's lack of independence and credibility
because it has become "a football between the party in power and the party
in opposition" as the cases initiated by one regime arc neutralized by the
next. 210 A former CBI director, D.R. Karthikeyan, admitted that as the CBI
was a government department, it was "expected to work as per the

205. Narasimhan, "Prevention of Corruption," p. 255.
206. Ibid., p. 256.
207. Krishna K. Tummala, "Can India Combat Corruption?" in Jon S.T. Quah (Ed.).
Di.fferent Paths to Curbing Cormplion: Lessons from Denmark. Finland. Hong Kong, New
7..ealaml a/Ill Singapore (Bingley, UK: Emcmld Group Publishing. 2013 ), p. 174.
208. S.S. Gill, The l'athology of Corntpticm (New Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India,
1998), p. 238.
209. Madhav Godbole. The Changing Times: A Commemm:1· on Current A,(f{tirs (New
Delhi: Orient Longman, 2000), p. 88.
210. N. Villa(, Ending Comtption? /low to Clean Up India (New Delhi: Penguin Books
India, 2012), pp. 132-134.
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direction of its employer." 211 The harshest cnttctsm was made by a
Supreme Court Justice, R.M. Lodha, who denounced the CBI in May 2013
for being a "caged parrot" and "its master's voice" and scolded the
attorney-general for interfering in the CBI's investigation of the
"Coalgate" scandal involving alleged irregularities in the allocation of
coaltield licenses to private companies. 212
The Supreme Court of India found that the CBI did not follow the
proper procedure in investigating the Hawala scandal in 1991 because the
alleged offenders were powerful persons. 113 Consequently, on December
18, 1997, it directed the transfer of the CBI' s supervision from the central
government to the eve, which became a statutory body responsible for
supervising the CBI's operations with the enactment of the CVC Act, 2003
on September II, 2003. 214 The CVC supervises the CBI's operations by
conducting monthly meetings with the CBI director to review the progress
and quality of the cases investigated. Furthermore, the eve advises the
disciplinary and other agencies in disciplinary cases involving vigilance at
the investigation and inquiry stages. It also supervises the vigilance and
anti-corruption work in the ministries and departments of the central
government. The Chief Vigilance Officers (CVOs) in the ministries and
departments provide advice on vigilance administration and the
establishment of effective systems and procedures to remove systemic
failures or loopholes. They submit monthly and annual reports to the eve,
which holds annual zonal meetings to review and monitor their
performance. 215

Table 20: Complaints received and disposed by the eve, 2010-2015
Year

Complaints received

Complaints disposed

2010
2011
2012
2013

16.260
16.929
37,039
31.432

16.211
17,238
33.308
33.284

211. Ibid .• p. 23.
212. Ross Colvin and Satampa Bhattachaljya. "i\ 'caged parrot' Supreme Court describes
CBJ," Reuters, May 10,2013.
213. The Hawala scandal involved I he payment of USS IN million to several politicians by
four hawala brokers. including the Jain brothers. A "hawala" is an illegal tmnsaction in foreign
currency und an economic offense punishable under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act,
1973. Sec N.K. Singh, The Politics of Crime and Cormption: A{ormer C/11 officer speaks (New
Delhi: HarpcrCollins Publishers, 1999), p. 164.
214. CVC. Amuml Report .?tJtJN (New Oelhi: CBI, 2009), p. I.
215. Ibid., pp. 2 and 6.
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2014
2015
Total

62,362
29,838
193,860

62,099
30,789
192,929

Sources: CVC, Amma/ Report2014 (New Delhi: eve, 2015), pp. 23-24 and eve. Annual
Report2015 (New Delhi: CVC, 2016), p. 22.

The CVC consists of three Commissioners and 257 personnel (with
39 vacant positions) and also relies on 208 full-time CVOs and 500 parttime CVOs in various government departments in 2015. 216 The CVC and
the internal vigilance machinery in the ministries and government
departments are understaffed to handle its heavy workload, as reflected in
the complaints and vigilance cases received and disposed by the CVC from
2010-2015. Table 20 shows that the CVC has received 193,860 complaints
and disposed of 192,929 complaints during this period. Similarly, Table
21 confirms that the CVC has received 31 ,698 vigilance cases and
disposed of 31 ,855 of these cases during 2010-2015.

Table 21: Vigilance cases received and disposed by the eve, 20102015
Year
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Total
Sources:

Cases received
5,327
5,573
5,528
5,423
5,492
4,355
31,698

Cases disposed
5,522
5.341
5,720
4,801
5,867
4,604
31,855

eve. Ammal Report20/4, p. 14 and eve. AIIIIIIUI Repor/2015. p.

/4.

Apart from its severe staff shortage, the other limitation of the CVC
is that it is an advisory body that relics on other public agencies to
investigate the complaints of misconduct by civil servants it receives.
Consequently, given the CVC's limited budget and personnel, it has no
alternative but ..to continue to rely on vigilance divisions in government
organizations and public sector units, which remain wcak." 217

216. CVC, tlmmal Rt•port 2015 (New Delhi: CVC. 2016), pp. vii, 98.

217. Vikram Menon, "Anti-Corruption in India: Issues and Strategies." in Vikram K. Chand
(Ed.), Reinventing P11blic Sen·ice Deli1·ery• in lm/ia: Selected Clue Swdie.• (New Delhi: Sage

Publications, 2006), p. 339.
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C. Philippines' Competing ACAs
President Elpidio Quirino established the Integrity Board on May 25,
1950 to investigate complaints of corruption against civil servants in the
Philippines. However, it was short-lived and dissolved in November 1950
because of the lack of public support. 218 During the next 51 years. 18
ACAs were created by the various presidents, culminating in the formation
by President Gloria Macapagai-Arroyo of the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission (PAGC) and the Governance Advisory Council in April and
July 200 I, respectively. 21'1 Today, the Philippines has five A CAs: the
OMB (the lead ACA); the Sandiganbayan (Special Anti-Graft Court): the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG); the InterAgency Anti-Graft Coordinating Council (IACC); and the Office of the
Deputy Secretary for Legal Affairs, which assumed the PAGC's functions
after its dissolution in November 2010 by President Benigno S. Aquino
III. 220 However, in spite of the efforts of these five ACAs, corruption
remains a serious problem in the Philippines judging from its performance
on eight indicators in 2016, as shown in Table 22. While the CPI score of
the Philippines has increased from 2.77/10 in 1995 to 35/100 in 2016, it is
still ranked 10 P' among 176 countries in 2016. The Philippines' score on
the PERC corruption survey has increased from 6.60 to 7.05, indicating
that the problem of corruption has deteriorated during 1995-2016.

Table 22: Philippines' Performance on Corruption Indicators, 2016
Indicator
Control of Corruption
Corruption Perceptions Index
PERC Corruption Survey
Diversion of Public Funds
Irregular Payments and Bribes
Organized Crime
Ethical Behavior of Fim1s
Public Trust in Politicians

Philippines' Performance
-0.5 (34. I)
101"/176 (35/100)
IO'h/16 (7.05/10)
102 00/138 (2.917)
I 05'h/138 (3.217)
H9'h/138 (4.317)
71 "/I 38 (3.817)
99' 11/138 (2.417)

So11rces: World Bank, "Worldwide Governance Indicators 2016"; Transparency
International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2016"; Asian lntelliRt'nce, No. 944, March
30, 2016, p. I; and Schwab (Ed.). 7111.' Global Competilil'f!fless Report 2016-2017, p. 297.

211!. Quah. "Bureaucratic Com1ption in the ASEAN Countries," 159.
219. Quah. C11rhing Corr11ption in Asian Cowuries. p. 136.
220. Eric Vincent C. Batalla, "Trending the Straight and Righteous Path: Curbing Corruption
in the Philippines," Asian f.'ducation and /Jevelopmem St11dit•s. 4 (I) (20 15): 55-56.
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Corruption is widespread in the Philippines because the many ACAs
have been ineffective during the past 67 years. There are two indicators of
the weak political will of the many governments in the Philippines in
combating corruption since 1950: (I) the inadequate human and financial
resources allocated by the government to the OMB, as reflected in its high
staff-population ratio and low per capita expenditure 221 and (2) the
continued reliance by Filipino political leaders on ineffective multiple
ACAs without making any improvements to enhance their effectiveness.

Table 23: OMB's Budget and Personnel, 2005-2014
OMB
Budget (in millions)
Personnel
Per capita
expenditure
Staff-population
ratio

2005

2008

2011

2013

2014

US$12.0
957
US$0.15

US$19.6
1,007
US$0.22

US$25.2
1,193
US$0.26

US$37.5
1,211
US$0.38

US$38.8
1,214
US$0.39

1:85,057

1:89,076

1:79,883

1:80,512

1:81,631

Sources: Compiled and calculated by the author from the OMB's budget and personnel
provided in its annual reports from 2005-2014.

Table 23 shows that even though the OMB's personnel and budget
have increased during 2005-2014, it is still severely under-staffed and
under-funded because its staff-population ratio has fluctuated from
I :79,883 in 20 II to I :89,076 in 2008 and its per capita expenditure has
increased from US$0.15 to US$0.39 during 2005-2014. Former
Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo concluded that the OMB was "designed to
fail because of its crippling lack of resources" as he found that in 2004, the
OMB 's field investigator-bureaucracy ratio of I: 17,045 compared
unfavorably with the ICAC's ratio of I :208, and the ICAC's per capita
expenditure of US$12.43 exceeded the OMB's per capita expenditure of
US$0.10 by 116 times. 222 ln 2014, there were 980 vacancies as the OMB
had I ,214 personnel or 55.3 percent of its established strength of 2,194
positions.223
Apart from its limited budget and personnel, the OMB also lacks
credibility as impeachment complaints were filed in 1996, 2001 and 2002

221. Jon S.T. Quah, "Benchmarking for Excellence: A Comparative Analysis of Seven
Asian Anti-Corruption Agencies," 1bia Pac!fic Joumal of Public Administration, Jl (2)
(December 2009): 182.
222. Simeon V. Marcelo, Combating Corntplion in the Philippines: Are we Plwulering our
Chances or Doing it lleuer? (Quezon City: National College of Public Administration and
Govcnmnec, University of the l'hilippines, Working Paper Series No.2, 2005), pp. I and 3.
223. OMB, Amwal Report:!0/4 (Quezon City: OMB. 2015), p. 35.
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against Ombudsman Aniano Desierto during his seven-year term for
betraying the public trust. Even though these complaints were dismissed
by congressmen, they have "sullied the already unsavoury reputation of
the Ombudsman."m Hence, it is not surprising that the respondents in the
2009 Social Weather Stations Surveys of Enterprises on Corruption
viewed the OMB negatively with a net sincerity rating of -8 percent. 225
Ombudsman Merceditas Guiterrez was criticized for focusing the OMB's
limited resources on investigating petty corruption instead of continuing
her predecessor's exposure of grand corruption cases. Consequently, the
OMB was described as "the Street Ombudsman" because of its emphasis
on investigating petty corruption cases. 226 As Guiterrez was a classmate of
the First Gentleman, Miguel Arroyo, she was criticized for protecting the
interests of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, her husband, their friends
and political allies. She was impeached by Congress on March 22, 20 II
for not investigating the allegations against former President MacapagaiArroyo and resigned as Ombudsman on May 5, 2011. 227 The OMB's net
sincerity rating under the administration of President Benigno Aquino has
declined from +39 percent in 2012 to +30 percent in 2016. 228
The other two major ACAs-the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) and Inter-Agency Anti-Graft Coordinating Council
(IACC)-are ineffective in curbing corruption tor different reasons. The
PCGG was formed by President Corazon Aquino in February 1986 to
identify and retrieve the money stolen by the Marcos family and its
cronies. It is not strictly speaking, an ACA because it is not involved in
investigating corruption cases or in corruption prevention and education.
Nevertheless, it has been a target for charges of corruption, favoritism and
incompetence. By June 1988, five of its agents were charged with
corruption and 13 agents were under investigation_22') Quintin Doromal,

224. Sheila S. Coronel and Lorna Kalaw-Tirol, b!l"estigating Cormption: A Do-lt-rour.w:lf
Guide (Quezon City: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2002), pp. 261-262.
225. Linda Luz B. Guerrero, Mahar Mangahas and Leo Rando S. Laroza, 7111! 2009 SII'S
Sm·•·eys of EmeqJrises on Corntption (Quezon City: Social Weather Stations, 20 10), p. 7.
226. "The Street Ombudsman." News break Online. November 21, 2006.
227. M. Cayabyab, "PH Ombudsman behind other anti-com1ption agencies in Asia.'' 1'/:"RA
Files. May 10,2011.
228. Social Weather Stations. "The IJ'h SWS Survey of Enterprises on Corruption: Marked
Improvement in the Fight against Corruption in the last six years, but 2016 Survey shows some
backsliding,"
Manila,
October
5,
2016,
available
at:
https://www .sws.org.phlswsmain/artcldisppage/'!artcsyscode= ART -20161 005151549
(accessed June 19, 2017).
229. Jon S.T. Quah, "Comparing Anti-Corruption Measures in Asian Countries," Asian
Review of Public Administration. II (2) ( 1999): 81.
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who was the PCGG Commissioner from April 1986 to October 1987, was
charged for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic
Act No. 30 19) on January 25, 1988. His successors, Ramon Diaz and Mary
Concepcion Bautista, were also charged in 1989 for the same offense. 230
In January 2013, the PCGG chair, Andreas Bautista, admitted that the
accusations against the PCGG officials were "not without basis" because
"they were the ones in charge of the chicken coop and some of them helped
themselves to the eggs.'' 231 By 2016, after 30 years, the PCGG had
recovered only a total ofUS$3.4 billion from Swiss bank deposits, shares,
real estate, paintings and jewelry. 232 As the PCGG has failed to meet its
objective of recovering fully the US$1 0 billion stolen by Marcos and his
family after 31 years, it has certainly outlived its usefulness and should be
abolished without further delay. 233
The IACC is a voluntary alliance of the OMB, Civil Service
Commission (CSC), Commission of Audit (COA), PAGC and National
Bureau of Investigation formed by their heads on June II, 1997. The
Department of Justice became the sixth member in 1998 and President
Estrada officially recognised the IACC as part of his anti-corruption policy
in August 1999.234 The IACC's three functions arc: (l) coordinating the
activities of its members by sharing information, initiating the prevention,
detection, investigation and prosecution of graft cases, and forming ad hoc
inter-agency task forces to investigate major cases involving substantial
losses of government resources; (2) conducting inter-agency skills training
programs for the personnel of its members to enhance their skills in fraud
detection, investigation, and prosecution of the offenders; and (3)
promoting inter-agency conferences to enable the personnel of its
members to exchange ideas and discuss common issues and problems. 235
The IACC's role is to enhance coordination among its member
agencies but, "in reality, it is not active." 236 The IACC has only met twice,
and the "slow progress in its revitalization" reflects the inability of its six

230. Asian Institute of Strategic Studies (AISS), Grappling with Graft and Cormption
(Quezon City: AISS, 2003), pp. 143,465.
231. "PCGG: Hunt for Marcos loot to end," lnq11irer.twt. January 2, 2013.
232. "The Marcos family fortune," Straits rimes, August 31, 2017, p. A 16.
233. Quah, "Evaluating the Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Agencies in Five Asian
Countries," I 54.
234. OMB, Annual Repor/1010 (Quezon City: OMB. 2011 ), pp. 26-27.
235. Sofronio B. Ursa), Ami-Graft Guidebook (Quezon City: Good Governance Books,
2006 ). pp. 222-223.
236. Eiji Oyamada, "President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's Anti-Corruption Strategy in the
Philippines," Asian .lo11nwl of l'olitical Science, 13 (I) (June 2005): 99.
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member agencies to collaborate eflectively among themselves. m
Alexander Rodriguez of the COA said that it was "almost impossible" to
get the heads of the six member agencies to meet because of their hectic
schedules. 238 The former Ombudsman, Merceditas Gutierrez,
"deactivated" the IACC by not convening it. Furthermore, instead of
cooperating with the CSC, the OMB competed with it by also
implementing the Oplan Red Plate program, which the OMB, COA, and
CSC had earlier agreed under the Solana Covenant to be the CSC's
responsibility. 239 The IACC's inability to coordinate the activities of the
ACAs is reflected in the UNODC's Country Review Report of the
Philippines, which has identified "inter-agency coordination and limited
resources" as the major challenges faced by the OMB in investigating
bribery and embezzlement cases. 240 Like the PCGG, the IACC has clearly
outlived its usefulness and should be disbanded without further delay.
The second manifestation of the Filipino political leaders' weak
political will in curbing corruption is their continued reliance on
ineffective multiple ACAs in spite of their flaws. Like Afghanistan, China.
India, Pakistan, Taiwan and Vietnam, the Philippines also adopted the
strategy of relying on multiple ACAs instead of a single ACA. Quimson
contends that the proliferation of ACAs in the Philippines has led to
"duplication, layering and turf wars.'' 241 Instead of coordinating their
activities and cooperating with each other, these ACAs compete tor
recognition, personnel and resources because they are understaffed and
poorly funded. Their overlapping jurisdictions diffuse anti-corruption

237. Ronald D. Holmes, "Combating Comtption in the Philippines: The Ditliculty and
Danger of Organizational Reform/lluman Resource Development Initiatives." in Ma
Concepcion P. AI filer and Eleanor E. Nicolas (Eds.), l'ub/ic Administration plus Gm•erna11ce:
Assessing the Past, Addressing the Future (Quezon City: National College of Public
Administration, University of the Philippines. 2007), p. 181.
238. Coronel and Kalaw-Tirol./m·esli~cllin~ Cor111ption. p. 274.
239. Transparency and Accountability Network (TAN). 7'he Office of the Omlmd.wum: Is
there Institutional Weukness? PHDR Issue 200!1/2009, No. 2, p. 5.
240. UNODC, Country Review Report of the Philippines. Review by Bangladesh and Egypt
of the Implementation by the Philippines of Articles 15-42 of Chapter Ill. "Criminali7.ation and
Law Enforcement" and Articles 44-50 of Chapter IV, "International Cooperation." of the
UNCAC for the 2011-2012 review cycle, pp. 8, 35, Vienna, 2012, available at:
http://www.ombudsman.gov.ph/docs/uncac/Philippines%20Country"lo20Report.pdf (accessed
August 8, 2017).
241. Gabriella Quimson, National lflfegrity Sysl<'llls Transparency ftuematimw/ Cormtl)'
Sllldy Report: Philippines 2006 (Berlin: Transparency International, 2006), p. 30.
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efforts, and result in "poor coordination in policy and program
implementation, weak management and wastage of resources. "242
Why are new ACAs created by a new administration in the
Philippines without evaluating the effectiveness of the existing ACAs? As
the establishment of such ACAs is redundant, expensive and inefficient,
Co et a/. have advised that a new elected government should enhance
existing anti-corruption measures instead of initiating new reforms. 243
Unfortunately, President Rodrigo Duterte has ignored their wise advice
and announced in his speech to 70 new presidential appointees on August
29, 2017 that he would establish a new PAGC to investigate corruption
complaints in government. Apart from not justifying the creation of the
PAGC, President Duterte also demanded unrealistically that the
investigation of corruption complaints should not exceed more than a
month. 244 The continued reliance on the ineffective multiple ACAs during
the past 67 years is an unequivocal manifestation of the Filipino political
leaders' lack of political will in combating corruption.
V. NINE LESSONS FOR POLICYMAKERS IN ASIAN
COUNTRIES

Although the dijjiculties l?{ applying lessons are numerous, the
costs c?f ignorance are substantial too.
Richard Rose 245
Table 24 provides a convenient summary of the analysis of the
different levels of effectiveness of the ACAs in six Asian countries.
Singapore, Hong Kong SAR and South Korea employ the third pattern of
corruption control as they rely on the CPIB, ICAC and ACRC,
respectively, to enforce the anti-corruption laws. By contrast, China, India
and Philippines employ the second pattern of corruption control of relying
on multiple ACAs, ranging from two ACAs in India, four ACAs in China
and five ACAs in Philippines (see Table 15). From Table 24, it can be seen
that Type A ACAs like Singapore's CPIB and Hong Kong's ICAC are

242. Oyamada, "President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's Anti-Corruption Strategy in the
Philippines," 99.
243. Edna E.A. Co, M. Lim, M.E.J. lao and l.J. Juan, Minimizing Lim·uption: Philippine
Democmc:v Assessmem (Pasig City: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Philippines Office, 2007), p. 21.
244. Pia Ranada, "Dutcrtc to create anti-graft commission," Rapph•r, 29 August 2017,
available at: https://www.rappler.com/rmtion/180499-duterte-ereatc-anti-graft-commission
(accessed September I, 20 17)
245. Richard Rose, l.eamingfrom Comparati1·e Public Polic:r: A Practical Guide (london:
Routledge, 2005), p. xii.
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more effective than the Type B ACAs in South Korea, China, India and
Philippines, judging from their 2016 CPI rankings and scores and other
indicators. Apart from the strong political will of the governments of
Singapore and Hong Kong SAR, which is reflected in their higher per
capita expenditures and favourable staff-population ratios in 20 14, both
city states have higher GOP per capita and levels of government
effectiveness in 2015 than the other four countries.
Table 24: Comparison of Six ACAs, 2014-2016
ACA

CPI
rank
&
score
2016

GDPper
capita
2015

Per capita
expenditure
2014

Staffpopulation
ratio 2014

Government
effectiveness•
2015

CPIB
(Type A)
Singapore
ICAC
(Type A)
Hong Kong
SAR
ACRC
(Type B)
South
Korea
CCDI
(Type B)
China
CBI
(Type B)
India
OMB
(Type B)
Philippines

7'h
(84)

US$52,888

US$5.36

I:26,682

100.0

15'h

US$42,327

US$16.59

1:5.333

99.0

52nJ
(53)

US$27,221

US$1.15

1:108,430

80.3

79'h
(40)

US$8,027

No datah

No datah

68.3

79'h
(40)

US$1,598

US$0.05

I:228,206

56.3

I0 I"
(35)

US$2,904

US$0.39

1:81.631

57.7

(77)

•Data provided are the percentile ranks of the six countries
bChina's CCDI docs not publish data on its budget and personnel.
So11rces: Tmnsparency lntcmational, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2016"; World Bank,
"GDP per capita (current US$)"; World Bank. "Worldwide Governance Indicators 2015"
and Tables 9, II, 13, 19 ami 23.

There are nine lessons that policymakers can learn from the analysis
of the different levels of effectiveness of the ACAs in the six Asian
countries in the previous sections.

64

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

A. Political Will is Essential for Effective Corruption Control

After reviewing several definitions, Post, Raile and Raile define the
"complex, multifaceted concept" of political will as "the extent of
committed support among key decision makers for a particular policy
solution to a particular problcm." 246 Brinkcrhoffs specific definition of
political will is "the commitment of actors to undertake actions to achieve
a set of objectives - in this case, anti-corruption policies and programs and to sustain the costs of those actions over time.'' 247 In other words,
political will refers to the sustained commitment of political leaders to
implement anti-corruption policies and programs. In the same vein,
Kpundeh contends that political will is "a critical starting point for
sustainable and effective anti-corruption strategies and programs" because
elected or appointed leaders, civil society watchdogs and other
stakeholders must demonstrate "credible intent" to "attack perceived
causes or effects" of systemic corruption. Indeed, without political will,
promises by political leaders and governments to reform the civil service
or combat corruption will "remain mere rhetoric.'' 248
Political will is critical for effective corruption control as politicians
can change "a culture of corruption if they wish to do so" because "they
make the laws and allocate the funds that enable the laws to be enforced."
Consequently, it is not surprising that those corrupt politicians "who arc
the greatest beneficiaries of corruption have the greatest power and use the
corrupt nature of government to maintain that power." 249 As combating
corruption is expensive, the ACAs need sufficient budget and personnel to
enforce the anti-corruption laws impartially. A World Bank study of the
effectiveness of 50 ACAs concludes that "political will and commitment
are the cornerstone of every successful anti-corruption effort. " 250

246. Lori Ann Post, Amber N.W. Raile and Eric D. Raile. "Defining Political Will," l'o/itic.~
am/ Policy. 38 (4) (2010): 659.
247. Derick W. Brinkerhoff. "Assessing Political Will for Anti-Corruption Efforts: An
Analytic Framework," Public Administmtion am/ /Jen:lopment, 20 (3) (2000): 242.
248. Sahr J. Kpundch, "Political Will in Fighting Corruption," in Kpundeh and llors (Eds.),
Corn1ption Integrity lmprm•ementlnitiati•·es in Dew/oping Countries, p. 92.
249. Jan Senior, Corruption the ll'orlcl's Big C: Cases, Causes, Consequences, Cures
(london: Institute of Economic Affitirs, 2006), pp. I K4, IK7.
250. Franccsca Rccanatini, "Anti-Corruption Authorities: An Effective Tool to Curb
Corruption'!" in Susan Rosc-Ackcnnan and Tina Soreide ( Eds.), llllemationall/andhook oil tht•
Economics of Corruption, Vol. 2 (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2011 ), p. 565.
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Table 25: Per Capita Expenditures and Staff-Population
Ratios of Nine ACAs, 2014
ACA

Budget
(in millions)

Personnel

Per capita
expenditure

Staffpopulation
ratio

ICAC (Type A)
US$120. 14
1,358
US$16.59
1:5.333
CPIB (Type A)
1:26,682
US$29.30
205
US$5.36
ACRC (Type B)
US$58.30
465
US$1.15
I: 108.430
AAC (Type A)
US$14.40
240
US$0.61
1:97.641
OMB (Type B)
US$38.80
US$0.39
1.214
1:81.631
ACC (Type A)
1,264
US$5.99
US$0.37
1:127.369
KPK (Type A)
US$50.1 7
1,102
US$0.19
1:230,943
NAB (Type A)
US$20.52
402 3
US$0.11
I :461.442
CBI (Type B)
5,676
US$65.50
I :228,206
US$0.05
• As the NAB's personnel in 2014 is not available, its total manpower strength of 402 in
1999 is used as more than 300 seconded arn1y officers returned to the Pakistani army in
February 2001!. Sec Transparency International Pakistan, Pakistan National lnte~rity
.~)·stem Country Report 1014 (Karachi: TIP. 2014), p. 163.
Sources: Compiled and calculated by the author from the budgets and personnel provided
in the annual reports of the ACAs.

While all govemments have budget constraints, their "allocation of
limited resources for ACA activities" signals their lack of "genuine
commitment to the ACA 's mission. " 251 Table 25 confirms that the strong
political will of the govemments of Hong Kong SAR and Singapore in
curbing corruption is manifested in the higher per capita expenditures and
more favorable staff-population ratios of the ICAC and CPIB,
respectively. By contrast, the weak political will of the governments in
South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan and
India is reflected in the lower per capita expenditures and unfavorable
statT-population ratios of the ACRC, Agency Against Corruption (AAC),
OMB, Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), Komisi Pemberantasan
Korupsi (KPK), National Accountability Bureau (NAB) and CBI.
respectively.
In addition to providing suflicient budget and personnel to the AC A,
it will be shown below that the government has to further demonstrate its
political will by ensuring that the ACA functions as an independent
watchdog that enforces the anti-corruption laws impartially instead of an
ineffective paper tiger or, even worse, as an attack dog against its political
opponents.

251. Ibid., p. 549.
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B. The Importance of Policy Context
In view of the contextual differences of the 26 Asian countries shown
in Table 3, and the fact that the causes of corruption are country specific,
Shah cautions that adopting "one-size-fits-all approaches" to countries,
which vary widely in the incidence of corruption and quality of
governance, will fail because "policymakers need to understand the local
circumstances that encourage or permit public and private actors to be
corrupt." 252 As the incidence of corruption is inversely related to the
quality of governance in a country, those "countries with high corruption
have a low quality of governance, those with medium corruption have fair
governance, and those with low corruption have good governance." 253
There is a strong correlation between corruption and weak institutions
because "bad institutions allow corruption to take hold, and corruption
tends to weaken institutions over time leaving greed unchecked." 254 Table
26 shows that Singapore, Hong Kong SAR and Japan have a low incidence
of corruption and good governance. Conversely, those 20 countries with
high incidence of corruption from North Korea to Malaysia have poor
governance. The four countries with medium incidence of corruption
(Bhutan, Taiwan, Brunei and South Korea) have fair governance.

Table 26: Corruption Incidence and Quality of
Governance in 27 Asian Countries, 2016
Corruption
incidence

CPI rank and
score 2016
(N=176)

Low

7th(84)
15th(77)
20th (72)
27th (65)
31 51 (61)
4J 51 (58)
52nd(53)

Singapore
Hong Kong SAR
Japan
Bhutan
Taiwan
Brunei Darus.
South Korea

529.7
511.7
529.5
376.3
499.6
415.2
436.7

55th (49)
79th (40)
79th (40)
87th(38)
90th (37)

Malaysia
India
China
Mongolia
Indonesia

367.2
270.9
241.2
318.5
268.6

(N=3)

Medium
(N=4)

Country

Governance
(total
percentile
rankl 2016

Quality of
governance

Good
(500-600)

Medium
(370-499)

252. Shah, "Tailoring the Fight against Cormption to Country Circumstances," p. 236.
253. Ibid., p. 243.
254. Jake Bright and Aubrey Hruby, 71u· Ne.tt Aji-ica: A11 t:mergi11g Co11ti11ent Becomes a
Global Powerhouse (New York: St Martin's Press, 20 15 ), p. 125.
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95th (36)
290.9
Sri Lanka
95th (36)
226.0
Maldives
101,. (35)
259.0
Thailand
I 0 I,. (35l
237.0
Low
Philippines
High
170.0
(0-3691
(N=20)
101'' (35)
Timor-Leste
JIJ'" (33)
248.3
Vietnam
125.6
116' 11 (32l
Pakistan
170.1
123'~ (30)
Lao PDR
131" (29)
144.5
Nepal
136' 11 (28)
175.5
Papua N. Guinea
136t 11 (28)
130.1
Myanmar
I 45th (26l
Bangladesh
141.1
I 56th (21)
149.4
Cambodia
46.2
Afghanistan
169' 11 (15)
174'" ( 12)
North Korea
34.4
Sources: Compiled from Transparency International. "Corruption Perceptions Index 2016"
and World Bank. "Worldwide Governance Indicators 2016."

Shah contends that ACAs arc more likely to be effective in those
countries with low incidence of corruption and good governance, such as
Singapore and Hong Kong SAR, than in those countries with high
incidence of corruption and poor governance like China, India and
Philippines. 255 However, the success of Indonesia's KPK in combating
corruption shows that an ACA can be "highly effective even in an
environment of poor governance and high corruption, and in a relatively
short period."256 Nevertheless, policymakers in those Asian countries with
rampant corruption and poor governance must heed Shah's advice to avoid
misusing ACAs as "tools of political victimization" m as will be
elaborated below as the sixth lesson. Furthermore, policymakers in those
countries that are contemplating the establishment of an ACA, like Papua
New Guinea, should be aware of the preconditions tor its success and the
need to improve public sector governance by strengthening the rule of law
and institutions of accountability. 258
In sum, policymakers in those Asian countries that wish to enhance
the effectiveness of their ACAs must identify those unfavorable aspects of
their policy contexts which hinder their performance. For example, its
small land area of 298 sq. km is deceptive and not advantageous for
combating corruption because the Maldives consists of I, 190 small islands

255. Shah. "Tailoring the Fight against Cormption to Country Circumstances.'' pp. 243-244.
256. Emil P. Bolongaita. An £tception to til!' Ruh•? ll'hy Indonesia's Ami-Corruption
Commission succeed~ ll'herc others don't. U4 Issue. August. No. 4 (Bergen: C'hr. Michclsen
Institute. 2010). p. 28.
257. Shah. "T;~iloring the Fight against Com1ption to Country Circumstances.'' p. 244.
258. Ibid., p. 244.
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grouped into 26 atolls, which are spread over 90,000 km. According to
Gayoom, an Investigation Officer with the Maldives' ACC, the
geographical barriers between the islands make it difficult for the ACC
officers to reach destinations easily when prompt action is required to
investigate cases urgently. Sea or air travel is also costly and not always
available because of poor weather conditions. Consequently, it is time
consuming for the ACC officers to obtain a court order for freezing and
seizing suspicious bank accounts, confiscating undue properties and funds,
and searching and seizing documentary evidence. 259
C. Address Causes of Corruption and Not its Symptoms

The third Jesson is that policymakers must initiate appropriate
reforms to tackle corruption by addressing its causes instead of its
symptoms. In spite of what is known about the causes of corruption, 260
governments in many Asian countries have failed to do so because it is
easier to deal with the symptoms than to address the root causes of
corruption. 261 More importantly, corruption is widespread in many Asian
countries because their political leaders have made decisions which
facilitate rather than curb corruption. Furthermore, corrupt politicians,
civil servants, business persons and citizens in these countries resist and
subvert the implementation of comprehensive anti-corruption reforms to
protect their vested interests.
In his comparative study of anti-corruption measures in Hong Kong,
India and Indonesia, Palmier identified three important causes of
corruption: low salaries of civil servants: ample opportunities for
corruption provided by regulations and red tape; and the low probability
of detecting and punishing corrupt offenders. 262 More specifically, he
hypothesized that: "At one extreme, with few opportunities, good salaries,
and effective policing, corruption will be minimal; at the other, with many
opportunities, poor salaries, and weak policing, it will be considerable."263
Thus, it would be difficult for many Asian countries to minimize
corruption if their governments fail to improve the low salaries of their

259. Fathimath Haifa Abdul Gayoom, ''Criminal Justice Response to Com1ption in
Maldi\'es," Resource .\/meria/.1· Series. No. 98 (20161: L\9.
260. Sec for example, Daniel Treisman. "What have We Learned about the Causes of
Corruption from Ten Years ofCross-National Empirical Research'?" Annual Rel'iewofPolitica/
Science. /0 (20071: 211-244.
261. Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner. 711ink like a Freak: Jlm1· to 111i11k Smarter
abowAI11uW 1:'1'1'1)'/hing (London: Allen Lane, 20141. pp. 66-67.
262. Palmier. 71Je Comml o(llureaucratic Cormption, p. 271.
263. Ibid .. p. 272.
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civil servants, reduce red tape, and increase the probability of detecting
and punishing corrupt offenders.

Table 27: Red Tape and Corruption in Ten Asian Countries in 2016
Country

Sinl!aoorc
South Korea
llonl! Korw SAR
Taiwan
Malaysia
Papua New
Guinea
Mvanmar
Timor·l.cste
Banl!ladcsh
Afl!hanistan

Jo:use of doing
business rank
2016 (N=I89)
.~

,..
4'h

ll'h
1x••
1451h
I 67'•
17J'd
174'h
177'h

llealing with construction
permits
No. of
No. of days
procedures
10
26
10
28
II
72
10
93
79
15
17
217
14
16
13.4
II

95
207
269
353

CPI2016
Rank and
Score
(N=I76)
7th (84)
52nd (53)
1s•• (77)
JIV ({J))
55th (4 1))
IJ(Jth (2!\)

136'h (2!\)
101~ (35)
145th(26)
J69L' (15)

World Bank, Doit1~ BIL5itJess :!0/6: Mt•as11rit1g Re,.,'lllatory Qua/i~l' at1d Ej]icietl(\'
(Washin1,.>ton, DC: World Bank, 2016), pp. 110, 187,207,212, 217,222,226, 232, 23X·
239: and Transparency International, "Comtption Perceptions Index 2016."

Sources:

The association between red tape, which is reflected in the ease of
doing business rank, and corruption in ten Asian countries in 20 16 is
shown in Table 27, which confinns that the top tive Asian countries in
terms of the ease of doing business rank have higher CPI scores than their
bottom five counterparts. Singapore, which is ranked first for the ease of
doing business, has a CPI score of 84 compared to Afghanistan's 177'h
rank for the ease of doing business and its CPI score of 15 in 20 16.
Consequently, it is not surprising that while it takes 26 days to get a
construction pennit in Singapore, the same process of getting a
construction pennit requires 353 days in Afghanistan, or nearly 14 times
longer. In other words, it would be difficult to minimize corruption in
Asian countries without reducing red tape.

D. Rely on Country's Best Minds to Combat Corruption
Corrupt individuals and organizations in Asian countries are
powerful and have vested interests to circumvent the anti-corruption laws
to avoid arrest and conviction for their offenses. Corruption is a fonnidable
foe to defeat in these countries because corrupt individuals are highly
intelligent and capable of finding legal loopholes or other methods to
circumvent the anti-corruption laws. The most prominent example of a
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"career fraudster" 2M is Bernard Madoff, who was "smart, savvy, and
experienced at bucking the systcm" 265 because his Ponzi scheme had
resulted in defrauding his clients of more than US$10 billion. 266
The personnel of public organizations arc not only their "most
precious asset" but also "the critical factor" responsible for their
effectiveness. 267 Furthermore, the increased reliance on technology to
improve the delivery of public services in Asian countries today means
that their civil services must be able to maintain expertise by attracting.
nurturing and retaining high-quality personneJ.2 68 As specialized public
organizations, effective ACAs need "well-trained personnel, including
sufficient numbers with highly specialized skills" who arc recruited on the
basis of merit, adequately compensated and accountable for their
actions. 269
Schein has attributed Singapore's success to its incorruptible and
competent civil service as "having 'the best and brightest' in government
is probably one of Singapore's major strengths in that they arc potentially
the most able to invent what the country needs to survive and grow.'' 270
An important lesson from Singapore's experience in curbing corruption is
the CPIB's reliance on expertise. As shown in Section lll.A, the CPIB has
enhanced its enforcement capacity by focusing on capability building of
its officers and building networks and partnerships with other public
agencies in Singapore. The CPIB's commitment to organizational
excellence is reflected in the many awards it has won, beginning with the
Singapore Quality Class Award in 1998, followed by the People

264. A career fraudstcr is a malefactor whose primary motive is to commit fraud and other
crimes. Sec Mark Button ami Jim Gee, Coumering l·imul.for Compt'liti1·e Adval/lage: J11e
Pr(J/i.'ssimwl Approach to Reducing the l.ast Great 1/idden Cost (Chichester, UK: John Wiley
& Sons, 2013). p. 34.
265. Peter J. Sander, Madofl Corruption. Deceit and the Making of the World'.~ Mosl
iVotorious l'md Scheme (Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2009), p. 223.
266. Colleen P. Eren, /Jel'llie Mmlt!fland the Cri.~is: The Puh/ic 1i-ial of Capitalism
(Stanford. CA: Stanford University Press, 2017). p. 6.
267. 0. Glenn Stahl, P11hlic Personnd Administration. X'h edition (New York: Harper &
Row Publishers, 1983), pp. 3. 6.
268. Ibid., p. 13.
269. l'utri.:k Mcughcr uml Caryn Vnland, "Anti-Corruption Ag~nci<'' (A(' As): Office of
Democracy and Governance Anti-Corruption Program Brief' (Washington, DC: United Stutes
Agency for International Development, 2006), p. 12.
270. Edgar H. Schein, Strategic Pragmatism: The Culfllre of Singapore's Economic
De1·e/opment Hocml (C'amhritlgc. MA: MIT J>ress, 1996), pp. 221-222.

COMBATING ASIAN CORRUPTION

71

Excellence Award in 2003, and the Distinguished Public Service Award
for Organizational Excellence in 2005. 171
Hong Kong's ICAC has also succeeded in recruiting qualified
personnel with its "special qualifications, screening procedures, and
remuneration packages" as it has filled I ,369 positions (94 percent) of its
sanctioned strength of I,457 personnel in 20 16. 272 However, as shown in
Table 28, some ACAs like Sri Lanka's Commission to Investigate
Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC), Bhutan's ACC.
Philippines' OMB, Bangladesh's ACC and India's CBI have encountered
tremendous difficulties in recruiting personnel to stafT their positions. As
Sri Lanka's CIABOC has 56 percent vacancies, its existing staff of 353
personnel in 2015 is clearly inadequate and cannot cope with the
increasing number of complaints and the backlog of 13,665 complaints
during the same year. It is therefore not surprising that the CIABOC has
identified its "foremost challenge" as the "lack of staff to handle the rising
number of complaints.'' m It would be difficult for the CIABOC to
improve its performance without recruiting more qualified personnel to till
its vacant positions.

Table 28: Vacant Positions in Five Asian ACAs, 2014-2015
Vacant
Establishment
Actual
(100%)
Positions
Streneth
5,676 (85%)
1.000 ( 15%)
India's CBI
6,676
21114
960(76%)
Bangladesh's ACC
21114
1.264
304 <24~<>>
1.214 (55%)
980 (45'Vo)
Philippines' OMB
21114
2.194
70 (55%)
58 (45%)
Bhutan's ACC
21115
128
449(56%)
353 (44%)
2015
802
Sri Lanka's CIABOC
So11rces: CBI, Ann11al Repor/ 2014 (New Delhi: CBI. 2015). p. X4; Tmnsparcncy
International Bangladesh. Ami-( 'ormplion Agencies Strengthening lnitialil't' Assessment
of Bangladesh :lnti-Cormplion Commission !0/6 (Dhaka: TIB, 2016), pp. 22-23; OMB,
Amwal Reporl 2014 (Quezon City: OMB, 2015), p. 35; Bhutan ACC. :lmwal Report 20/.f
(Thimphu: ACC, 2015), p. 411; and CIABOC. Amuwl Report !015 (Colombo: CIABOC.
2016), p. 33.
ACA

Year

Similarly, Bhutan's ACC has also been unable to fill45 percent of its
sanctioned strength or to retain its staff as reflected in its high attrition rate

271. Jon S.T. Quah, "Curbing Corruption in Singapore: The Importance of Political Will.
Expcnise. Enforcement. and Context," in Quah (Ed.),l>if}crent Paths to Curbing Comtption, p.
156.
272. Meagher and Voland. "Anti-Corruption Agencies." p. 12 and ICAC. :lmwal Report
!0/6(Hong Kong: ICAC. 2017). p. 23.
273. CIABOC, Annual Rqwr/2015 (Colombo: CIAROC, 2016), pp. 33-34.
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of 16.2 percent in 2010 and 2014. The reasons for the ACC's low
recruitment and high attrition rates are: high workload and performance
pressure, demand for high behavioral standards, perceived inequalities, a
weak corporate culture, and better career opportunities elsewhere. The
ACC's serious staff shortage has aggravated the workload of the existing
personnel, especially the managers, and has affected its effectiveness in
combating corruption. 274
Table 28 shows that in 2014, the OMB's 1,214 personnel constitute
only 55 percent of its established strength of 2,194 positions. This means
that the OMB is severely under-staffed with 980 vacant positions (45
percent) in 2014. As Bangladesh ACC's 960 personnel constitute only 76
per cent of its approved staff strength of 1,264 in 2014, it needs to recruit
more personnel to fill its 304 vacant positions. India's CBI has only 15
percent vacancies in 2014 but it has been plagued by the problem of understaffing since its formation in 1963 because of its unpopular policy of
"deputation" of suitable personnel from the states or the Inspector General
of Police for transfer to the CBI. 275
In short, it is unrealistic lor a government to expect its ACA to be
efTective in curbing corruption if the ACA has not been provided with
adequate personnel to perform its anti-corruption functions. Bhutan's
ACC is trying its best to overcome its staff shortage among its small
population of797,760. India, Bangladesh, Philippines and Sri Lanka have
much larger populations but the CBI, ACC, OMB and CIABOC would be
unable to improve their performance unless their perennial statT shortage
is rectified.
E. Rely on an Independent, Well-Staffed and Funded Type A
ACA

The success of Denmark, New Zealand and Finland in combating
corruption, which is reflected in their top three rankings on the CPI in
2016, shows that it is possible to curb corruption effectively without
relying on an ACA if there arc other institutions to ensure good
governance. 271' However, this option is unsuitable for those Asian
countries that do not have other strong institutions to tackle the rampant
corruption. Faced with the other two alternatives of relying on either a
single ACA or multiple ACAs, policymakers should avoid relying on the
ineffective ACAs in China, India and Philippines, and establish a Type A
274. Bhutan ACC. Amwal Rt'port 20f.l (Thimphu: t\CC. .2015 l. pp. 39-40 .
.275. Palmier, 17/t' ( 'mllrol <l{!Jun•mtcmlic Corruption. pp. 34-35 .
.276. Jon S.T. Qm1h, "Different l'aths to Curbing Cormption: A Comparative Analysis," in
Quah (Ed.), DUJi.•twll Paths to Cur/Jill~ Cormption. pp . .225-232.

COMBATING ASIAN CORRUPTION

73

ACA like Singapore's CPIB or Hong Kong's ICAC. They should also
avoid creating a Type B ACA like South Korea's ACRC, which cannot
investigate corruption cases, or Philippines' OMB, which is severely
understaffed and poorly funded.
Unlike the CPIB and ICAC, the ACAs in many Asian countries are
ineffective because of their governments' weak political will, as reflected
in "their inadequate legal powers, limited budgets, lack of trained
personnel, and lack of independence." 277 In other words, most Asian
ACAs have not performed well because they are not independent, wellstaffed or adequately funded. This means that these AC As can only
improve their performance if their governments provide them with the
necessary operational autonomy, personnel and budgets to perform
effectively. Thus, China's CCDI, India's CBI, Philippines' OMB and
South Korea's ACRC would continue to be ineffective A CAs unless their
governments protect their independence and provide them with sutlicient
budgets and personnel.
Policymakers in those Asian countries like Japan and Papua New
Guinea, which do not rely on A CAs to curb corruption, must be willing to
provide the required independence, budget and personnel if they wish to
establish a Type A AC A. Japan signed the UNCAC on December 9, 2003
and its reluctance to ratify it during the past 14 years reflects its
government's unwillingness to establish a Type A ACA to eradicate the
existing system of structural corruption, which favors the "rotten triangle"
of corrupt politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen. Japan's continued
non-ratification of the UNCAC indicates its reluctance to establish a Type
A ACA to replace the ineffective and inadequately slatTed special
investigation departments of the Public Prosecutor's Offices in Tokyo,
Osaka and Nagoya. nx
Papua New Guinea does not have an ACA because it has relied since
its independence in 1975 on the Ombudsman Commission to investigate
complaints of maladministration, including corruption, and to enforce the
Leadership Code to ensure that those in leadership positions behave with
integrity. 279 In 1997, the first draft bill to establish an ICAC in Papua New

277. Jon S.T. Quah. ··controlling Corruption in Asian Countries: The Eltt~ive Search for
Success." in Ting Gong and Ian Scott ( Eds. ). Ro111/ed~e /lam/hook o{ Cormptioll ill Asia
(london: Routledge. 2017), p. 2~6.
278. Quah, "Evaluating the Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Agencies in Five Asian
Countries." pp. 156-157.
279. Albert Mcllam and Daniel Aloi, National Integrity ,\)·slems, 1hmsparell(\'
lnterna/iona/ Cotmlry S1111~\' Rqmrl: l'ap11a New Guim.>tt 20£13 (l'ort Moresby: Institute of
National Affairs, 21J03), pp. 30-31.
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Guinea failed because it lacked sufficient parliamentary support. To cope
with the absence of an ACA, Prime Minister Peter O'Neill formed the
Investigation Task Force Sweep (ITFS) on August 12, 20 II to investigate
corruption allegations in the Department of National Planning and
Monitoring initially, but its mandate was later extended to the
investigation of corruption in all government departments. With the prime
minister's support, the ITFS was effective during its first three years as it
convicted some high-profile politicians. However, its funding was cut
after it served the prime minister with an arrest warrant for corruption in
June 2014. 280
Papua New Guinea's short-lived experiment of relying on the ITFS
to curb corruption is instructive for policymakers in other Asian countries
in two respects. First, it shows the futility of establishing a temporary task
force to combat corruption instead of a permanent ACA. The second and
more important lesson to learn from the ITFS episode is that Papua New
Guinea's government must establish an independent Type A ACA that is
both well-staffed and adequately funded so that its budget cannot be
reduced arbitrarily by the prime minister if he is displeased with its actions.
The failure of Papua New Guinea to establish a Type A ACA after 20 years
should not minimize the importance of ensuring its independence and
allocation of sufficient budget and personnel when it is formed. However,
Act Now, a civil advocacy group in Papua New Guinea, has recently
criticized the government for removing the proposed ICAC's powers of
arrest and prosecution and making the prime minister in charge of the
appointment process of the commissioners in the draft ICAC legislation.
These amendments will make the proposed ICAC ..toothless" and
vulnerable to political interference. 281
F. Resist Temptation to Usc the ACA as an Attack Dog

As the Type A ACA has enormous powers, policymakers must avoid
making the serious mistake of giving into the temptation of using it as an
attack dog against their political opponents. Governments lacking the
strong political will to combat corruption usually establish ACAs as attack
dogs to conduct ..witch hunts" to ..attack and eliminate members of the
opposition or to punish members of their own party who are perceived as

280. Grant W. Walton. "Silent Screams and Muffied Cries: The Ineffectiveness of AntiCorruption Measur~'S in Papua New Guinea," .·hitm l:'ducatiollmul IJ.-,·dopmellt Studies, 5 (2)
(2016): 218.
2MI. "PNG Government removes critical powers !rom proposed corruption watchdog,"
l'acijic lsla11ds News Association. September 19, 2017. and "I'NG government criticised for
watering down ICAC draft." Radio New lea/mul. September 20. 2017.
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having stepped out of line."182 Corruption charges have been used as a
weapon to discredit political rivals and settle political scores in many
Asian countries, including Cambodia, China. Indonesia. Malaysia,
Myanmar, Pakistan, Thailand and Vietnam.m Hence, it is not surprising
that corruption is widespread in these Asian countries judging from their
CPI scores in 20 16.
As mentioned in Section IV.A, anti-corruption campaigns arc used in
China against political enemies to undennine their power base in the CCP
as shown in the persecution of CHEN Xitong, CHEN Liangyu, BO Xilai
and ZHOU Yongkang for corruption from 1995 to 2014. Prime Minister
HUN Sen has used the campaign against illegal logging in Cambodia to
remove those military officers who threatened his power. 2H4 In Myanmar,
the government has abused the anti-corruption laws to remove its political
opponents, including the arrest in 2004 of fonner Prime Minister General
KHIN Nyunt, his colleagues and family members on corruption
charges. 285 In Pakistan, "successive governments issued injunctions to
control corruption" but "more often than not, it was the political goal of
eliminating opposition which prompted legislation and subsequent court
trials for corruption."286
The reliance on ACAs as attack dogs against political opponents
undennines the public trust in their governments and their legitimacy
because it confinns that these governments are not committed to
minimizing corruption in their countries but use corruption as a weapon to
eliminate their political foes. As "corruption influences the level of trust,"
it flourishes in those countries with "low levels of trust" and their citizens
arc likely to distrust their governments if the AC As and other anticorruption policies are ineffective. 287 This means that citizens living in
those Asian countries with rampant corruption would have low trust in
their politicians. Hence, it is not surprising that South Korea and
Philippines, which are ranked 96th and 99th, respectively, among 138

282. Meagher and Voland, "Anti-Corruption Agencies," p. 6.
283. Djalal, "Southeast Asia," pp. 32-33; and AsianlmelliRence. No. 896, March 19,2014,
p. 2.
284. Djalal, "Southeast Asia." p. 32.
285. Quah, "Minimizing Corruption in Myanmar.'' 185.
286. Mohammad Wasccm, "Corruption. Violence ilnd Criminali7.ation of l'olitics in
Pakistan," in K.M. de Silva, G.H. Peiris and S.W.R. de A. Samamsinghc (Eds.), Corruption in
Sowh Asia - India, Pakistan and Sri l.anka (Kandy: International Center for Ethnic Studies,
2002), p. 158.
2!!7. Susan Rose-Ackerman and Bonnie J. Palilka, Cormption am/ Gowmnwm: Causes,
Consequences. and Reform. 2~>~ edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 20 16), pp. 248,
256-257,259.
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countries for the public trust in politicians in 2016, have lower levels of
trust in their politicians than Singapore (ranked I st) and Hong Kong SAR
(ranked 2P1). 288
G. Combating Corruption by Sector

The sectoral approach is recommended for combating corruption in
Asian countries because the best way to control its spread is by analysing
"its impact sector-by-sector." 289 As the incidence or vulnerability to
corruption varies by sectors in many countries, it makes sense to allocate
the limited anti-corruption resources to those sectors that are more
vulnerable to corruption. As Table 29 confirms that the police are the most
corrupt institution in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Papua
New Guinea, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam, anticorruption efforts in these nine countries should focus on minimizing
police corruption. Political parties in India, Japan, South Korea, Maldives,
Nepal and Thailand also require reform because they are perceived to be
the most corrupt institution in these six countries. As the parliaments in
Indonesia, Japan and Maldives are perceived to be the most corrupt
institution, they must also be reformed. Finally, reforms must be initiated
in the civil services in Mongolia and Pakistan, and the judiciary in
Afghanistan and Cambodia, to minimize corruption in these four
countries.
Two World Bank economists have recommended the use of"a roadmap approach" to track corruption vulnerabilities at the sector level
because it "orients policymakers toward results that a sector or core
process is supposed to achieve." Furthermore, this approach provides "a
more structured and detailed picture of a problem area and the potential
points of vulnerabilities specific to that area" and identifies "key
vulnerabilities" and "remedial measures that could have the greatest
impact on combating corruption in a problem area." Finally, the road-map
approach enables program implementers to track the incidence of
corruption throughout the program cycle so that they can initiate early
action where corruption has occurred. 290 Thus, the road-map approach is

288. Klaus Schwab (Ed.), The Global Competitireness Report 2016-2017 (Geneva: World
Economic Forum, 2016 ), pp. 197. 225, 297. 3 19.
289. Bertram I. Spector, "Fighting Corruption," in Bertram I. Spector (Ed.), Fighting
Cormption in De1•eloping Countries: Strllt,•gies and Ana(rsis (Bloomfield, CT: Kumerian Press,
2005), p. 6.
290. J. Edgardo Campos and Vinay Bhargava, "Introduction: Tackling a Social Pandemic,"
in J. Edgardo Campos and Sanjay Pradhan (Eds.), The Many Faces of Corruption: Tracking
Vulnerabilities at the Sec/or Lew/ (Washington. DC: World Bank, 2007), p. 8.
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practical because it focuses on "area-specific problems and solutions and
away from big picture discussions of corruption. " 291

Table 29: Perceptions of Corruption in 17
Asian Countries by Institutiona in 2013
Country

Police

Political
Parties
3.0
3.4
2.8
4.4
4.3
4.2
3.9
3.8
4.2
3.7
4.6
4.2
4.0

Parliament

Civil
Servants
3.3
2.9
2.9
3.8
4.0
3.9
3.3
3.3
3.3
4.2
4.4
4.3
4.0

Judiciary

Afghanistan
3.1
2.9
3.7
Bangladesh
3.2
3.5
3.9
2.4
Cambodia
3.1
3.7
3.8
3.3
India
4.1
4.4
Indonesia
4.5
4.5
Japan
3.0
3.8
4.2
3.2
3.8
South Korea
3.2
Malaysia
3.3
3.0
4.0
Maldives
3.2
4.0
4.2
Mongolia
3.9
3.7
4.0
4.2
Neoal
4.3
4.1
3.8
Pakistan
3.3
4.3
Papua New
3.8
3.2
4.4
Guinea
Philippines
3.5
3.7
3.8
4.0
3.5
Sri Lanka
3.1
3.0
3.4
2.5
3.8
Thailand
3.4
3.7
4.0
4.0
2.5
Vietnam
2.7
3.6
2.8
3.5
4.0
•The other seven institutions - private sector, medical and health, education system, media,
military. nongovernmental organizations, and religious bodies - arc excluded because of
their lower perceived incidence of corruption. The score ranges from I (not at all corrupt)
to 5 (extreme Iy corrupt).
Source: Transparency International, Global Cormption Barometer 2013 (Berlin:
Transparency International, 2013), pp. 35-38.

Policymakers concerned with tackling rampant corruption in Asian
countries should adopt the sectoral approach for two reasons. First, it
enables those governments committed to curbing corruption to concentrate
their limited resources in the most vulnerable sectors. Second, this
pragmatic strategy not only enhances the likelihood of success but should
also have positive spill-over effects on combating corruption in other
sectors because it demonstrates that rampant corruption can be defeated.

291. Ibid., p. 10.
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H. Nurture "Pockets of Effectiveness"

In his research on Nigeria, Roll has identified "pockets of
effectiveness" or those "public organizations which deliver public services
relatively effectively in contexts of largely ineffective government" and
widespread corruption. 292 A public organization in Nigeria is a "pocket of
effectiveness" only if it is effective in providing public services for the
public good for at least three years. Among the seven Nigerian public
organizations identified as "pockets of effectiveness," the two outstanding
examples are the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and
Control, and the National Agency for the Prohibition of Traffic in Persons
and Other Related Matters. These two organizations are efTective because
of their reliance on recruiting stafT on the basis of merit, integrity and
commitment; the incentives for training and performance: strict
disciplinary control to prevent corruption; and inclusive leadership and
management skills. 293
The identification of "pockets of effectiveness" by scholars in
countries with rampant corruption gives hope to policymakers and
reformers in Asian countries that systemic corruption can be defeated by
first identifying and supporting those exceptional public organizations
which are effective in combating corruption. Karklins contends that
"islands of integrity" can 'jump-start public confidence in reform" and
"trigger the subsequent improvement of other institutions." These "small,
initial successes" can "signal that corruption can be stopped" and have "a
snowball effect'' by encouraging actors in other sectors to follow suit. 294
The Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) is "a pocket of
effectiveness" in the Philippines because it has succeeded in increasing
foreign investment and providing more than six million jobs and remained
corruption-free in the midst of widespread corruption in the country. Its
first director-general, Lilu de Lima, reduced PEZA's bloated workforce of
I,016 personnel to 450 workers during her first year and dismissed those
employees who were found guilty of corruption offenses. She was given
the Ramon Magsaysay Award in 20 17 for transforming the PEZA into "a
showcase of successful regulatory reform, a model institution of honest

292. Michael Roll. The Srate thai Works: ''l'ockt•ts oll;/kctil•t•m·.~s" as a Pt•rspeclil•e 011
Statc11css ill /Je\'elopi11g Cmmrrit•s ( Mainz: Department of Anthropology and African Studies,
Johannes Gutenberg University, Working Paper No. 121!, 20 II). p. I. Sec also, Michael Roll
(Ed.). 71u· l'olitics <!ll'ublic Sec/or l'n:fimntmct•: l'ocket.~ <!l l;l]<•clil'em•.tl ill Dt•1•dopi11g
Cou/1/ries (London: Routledge, 2014).
293. Roll, 111e State that Works, pp. 4-6, 11-13.
294. Rasma Karklins, 111e System Made Me /Jo It: Corruption in Po.~t-Cmmmmist Societies
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharp, 2005), p. 159.
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and committed public service, and a key contributor to the nation's
economic growth." 295
A nationwide campaign known as "Integrity Idol" was conducted by
citizens in 2014 to identifY the most honest civil servant in Nepal. On
January II, 2015, Panchthar District Education Officer, Gyan Mani Nepal,
was selected as the "Integrity Idol" from more than 300 civil servants
nominated by citizens across Nepal for the award. 296 Governments in
Asian countries with widespread corruption should take a leaf from
Nepal's "Integrity Idol" campaign to conduct nationwide campaigns to ask
their citizens to nominate the most honest or least corrupt public agency.
Such campaigns will not only help the governments to identify "anticorruption champions" or "pockets of effectiveness" in combating
corruption like PEZA in the Philippines, but also enable them to give
national recognition to these exceptional honest public agencies in their
countries.

I. Combating Corruption is a Continuous Work in Progress
Combating corruption in Asian countries is a continuous work in
progress because, apart from the resources and expertise required by the
Type A ACAs, the implementation of the anti-corruption laws would be
strongly resisted by those intelligent and powerful corrupt individuals and
organizations with vested interests to circumvent these laws to avoid arrest
and conviction for their offenses. The challenge of combating political
corruption, organized crime and vote-buying in Taiwan is described as
"beheading the Hydra," the Greek mythical creature with several heads
that grew again when cut off. 297
To combat corruption successfully, governments in the Asian
countries must persevere and implement sustained anti-corruption
campaigns because corruption is like "a snake which will frequently
respond with poison, and will only die with repeated attack" and "only if
severed at the head." 298 They must also undertake the difficult tasks of
identifYing accurately the causes of corruption and implement appropriate

295. Roy Stephen C. Canivcl, "How ex-Peza chief kept agency corruption-free," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, August 28, 20 17.
296. "Panchthar DEO awarded with 'Integrity Idol'," Kathmandu Post, January 12, 2015,
and Pete Pattisson, "Nepal's Integrity Idol seeks civil servants with the X factor," The Guardian,
December II, 2014.
297. Christian Gobel, "Beheading the Hydra: Combating Political Corruption and Organized
Crime," China Perspectiws, 56 (November-December 2004): 1-17.
298. Laurence Cockcroft, Global Cormption: Money, Power and Ell1ics in the Modem
World (London: 1.8. Tauris, 2012), pp. 231-232.
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reforms to address these causes over a sustained period of time. The
previous sections have shown that the governments in China, India,
Philippines and South Korea have not only neglected these important tasks
but have also relied on ineffective and poorly-resourced Type B ACAs to
enforce their anti-corruption laws selectively and not impartially.
Consequently, it is not surprising that these four countries have failed to
minimize corruption.
Even though Singapore and Hong Kong SAR have succeeded in
curbing corruption, this does not mean that their governments and ACAs
can rest on their laurels because of the growing importance of private
sector corruption and other threats. The investigation and conviction of
four senior civil servants for corruption offenses during 20 I 0-2013
indicates that even though corruption is not a serious problem in
Singapore, the CPIB must remain vigilant to deal not only with public
sector corruption but with the increasing number of private sector
corruption cases in recent years. The shocking revelation in July 2013 that
the CPIB's assistant director, Edwin Yeo, misappropriated US$1.41
million during 2008-2012 has tarnished the CPIB 's reputation even though
he was found guilty and jailed for ten years. The ICAC has also not
hesitated to investigate political leaders and senior civil servants in Hong
Kong if they are accused of corruption offenses. As mentioned above, the
investigation of former Chief Executive Donald Tsang in February and
April 2012 resulted in his conviction and sentencing to 20 months'
imprisonment in February 2017 for misconduct in public office.
VI. CONCLUSION

Those who are corrupt are not simply "had" [but] evil to the
core.
Laura S. Underkuffier 99
As the lack of political will and capacity is the most important reason
for the failure of many Asian countries to curb corruption effectively
during the past six decades, their governments need substantial doses of
political will and capacity to implement impartially comprehensive
reforms to address the causes of corruption and to sustain their
implementation over a long period of time. However, this is a tall order
because of the scarcity and fragility of political will in these countries.

299. Laum S. Underkuffier, Caplllred br E1•i/: 11w !tlea t!/Corruption in Law (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 2013), p.90.
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Whether the policymakers in those Asian countries with rampant
corruption can draw lessons from the success stories of Singapore and
Hong Kong SAR, and the failures of China, India, Philippines and South
Korea, depends on their political will and capacity to establish Type A
ACAs and provide them with the necessary legal powers. budget,
personnel and operational autonomy to enforce the anti-corruption laws
impartially. This means that the Type A ACAs should operate as
independent watchdogs that investigate all corruption complaints
impartially, regardless of the status, position, or political atliliation of
those persons being investigated. These Type A ACAs should not be used
as attack dogs against their governments' political opponents, or as paper
tigers without the required resources and powers to investigate corruption
cases.
As combating corruption in Asian countries is a continuous work in
progress, policymakers concerned with improving the effectiveness of
ACAs in their countries must be realistic because the prospects for success
also depend on their ability to overcome the constraints of their
unf~!Vorable policy contexts, especially in those large Asian countries with
huge populations and poor governance. As sound political leadership is
the critical ingredient tor effective corruption control, the $64,000
question is: Whether the citizens in Asian countries with widespread
corruption have the wisdom to elect honest and competent leaders to
political office to implement the necessary reforms to address the causes
of corruption? Ifthey fail to do so, corruption would remain a way of life
because corrupt individuals and organizations in their countries would
continue to misbehave with impunity and encourage others to follow suit.
The price for inaction against these corrupt and evil individuals is too high
for the citizens in those Asian countries affected to pay.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AAC
ACA
ACB
ACC
ACO
ACRC
ADB
CAC
CBI
CCDI
CCP
CIABOC
CID
COA
CPI
CPIB

esc
eve
cvo
DIC
DSPE
FSI
GDP
GOI
IACC
ICAC
ITFS
KICAC

Agency Against Corruption
Anti-Corruption Agency
Anti-Corruption Branch
Anti-Corruption Bureau
Anti-Corruption Commission
Anti-Corruption Office
Anti-Corruption Civil
Rights Commission
Asian Development Bank
Commission Against
Corruption
Central Bureau of
Investigation
Central Commission for
Discipline Inspection
Chinese Communist Party
Commission to Investigate
Allegations of Bribery or
Corruption
Criminal Investigaton
Department
Commission of Audit
Corruption Perceptions Index
Corrupt Practices
Investigation Bureau
Civil Service Commission
Central Vigilance
Commission
Central Vigilance Officer
Discipline Inspection
Commission
Delhi Special Police
Establishment
Fragile States Index
Gross Domestic Product
Government of India
Inter-Agency Anti-Graft
Coordinating Council
Independent Commission
Against Corruption
Investigation Task
Force Sweep
Korea Independent
Commission Against
Corruption

KPK
MOJ
MOS
NAB
NCPB
NPA
OECD

OMB
PAGC
PAP
PDR
PCGG
PERC
PEZA
PLA
POBO
POCA
POCO
PPO
RHKPF
SAR
SPF
SPP

svc
UNCAC
UNDP
UNO DC
USAID

Komisi
Pembenmlclscm Korupsi
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Supervision
National Accountability
Bureau
N:~tion:~l Comtption
Prevention Bureau
Nation:~! Police Agency
Organization for Economic
Cooperation and
Development
Office of the Ombudsman
Presidenti:~l Anti-Graft
Commission
People's Action P:~rty
People's Democmtic
Republic
Presidential Commission on
Good Government
Politic:~( and Economic Risk
Consultancy
Philippine Economic Zone
Authority
People's Liberation Army
Prevention of Bribery
Ordinm1ce
Prevention of Corruption Act
Prevention of Corruption
Ordinance
Public Prosecutor's Office
Royal Hong Kong
Police Force
Special Administrative
Region
Singapore Police Force
Supreme People's
l'rocumtomtc
State Vigilance Commission
United Nations Convention
Against Corruption
United Nations Development
Programme
United Nations Office on
Dmgs and Crime
United States Agency for
International Developmcncnt
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